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CHAPTER ïo INTRODUCTION 
During the past thirty years considerable effort has been expended 
on analyzing the determinants of economic growth. One of the unresolved 
issues in this query is the nature of the interrelationships between 
agricultural development and industrialization. In earlier discussions 
of developmental priorities, deliberately-planned^ rapid industrialization 
was often advocated as the means whereby successful economic development 
could be achieved. During the 1940's and 1950it was widely believed 
that development of the industrial sector would provide employment 
opportunities for underemployed and unemployed labor and would result in 
increased demand for agricultural products, Thus^ the industrial sector 
as the leading sector would pull the backward agricultural sector to 
higher levels of development. Agriculture was largely considered to be 
passive in the developmental process. 
During the last decade, however, several theories of economic 
development and much empirical evidence have been presented which 
indicate a more significant role for the agricultural sector in the 
developmental process. Increased emphasis is now being placed on the 
formulation and implementation of developmental policies which exploit 
the interrelationships between the industrial and agricultural sectors in 
a manner which promotes mutual development. There is no unique blend of 
agricultural development and industrialization that will be best for ail 
countries. It is now widely believed that the relative emphasis to be 
given to each must vary according to the country^ its resource endowment. 
2 
and its phase of development. 
The Problem: Industrialization and Agricultural Development 
Many of the arguments for either industrialisation or agricultural 
development are doctrinaire. An argument in favor of industrialization is 
frequently viewed as an argument against agricultural development and vice 
versa. While it is true that industry and agriculture compete for 
resources 3 an argument in favor of one need not be an argument against the 
other since there are certain interrelationships and complementarities 
between the cwo sectors which can and should be exploited. However, a 
brief review of the arguments in favor of industrialization and agricul­
tural development may be useful. 
Industrialization 
Some of the more common arguments in favor of industrialization in 
less-developed areas are briefly outlined in this section. Not all are 
logically defensible arguments and some are based on erroneous assumptions. 
Some of these arguments are more appropriately considered to be emotional 
or passionate reasons in favor of industrialization. 
'^Eicher and Witt (10, pp. 7-10), Meier (37, Ch. 6), Ruttan (54, 
pp. 1-2), Thorbecke (59, pp. 3-7), and Witt (66) all express similar views 
about the evolution of thoughts. However, these views are not unanamously 
endorsed by either policy-makers or economists. Enke goes so far as to 
suggest that "....most LDC (less-developed country) governments associate 
industrialization with development and hence favor an expansion of 
industrial output that exceeds the ability of a neglected agriculture to 
support it" (11, p. 1127). As another example, in 1958, Higgins wrote that 
"Economic development in the past has consisted very largely of transferring 
population from low-productivity agriculture to much higher productivity 
industrial occupations, thus reducing population pressure on the land and 
permitting agricultural improvement in the form of large-scale mechanized 
agriculture at the same time" (17, p. 454-465). Kiggins uses this as a 
basis for advocating industrialization as the "engine for growth". 
3 
Perhaps the most common argument presented in favor of industrializa­
tion is the high correlation in various countries between per capita 
income and the proportion of the labor force employed in nonagricultural 
activities. Economic history suggests that rising per capita incomes 
have always been accompanied by reductions in the relative size of the 
2 
agricultural labor force. Similarly, the proportion of the total output 
originating from the agricultural sector tends to decline as per capita 
3 incomes increase. Thus, economic development is associated with 
industrialization. Prebisch goes so far as to state that "....industrial­
ization is an inescapable part of the process of change accompanying a 
gradual improvement in per capita income" (48, p. 251). 
Along similar lines, Myrdal (41, p. 1151) suggests that the very 
rapid development of industry through government planning in the Soviet 
Union has had a very important influence on planning activities in many 
countries in South Asia, i economy centered around a comprehensive 
industrial structure based on heavy industry is now widely accepted by 
2 See, for example, Ojala (46), or the massive works of Colin Clark 
(8). Zimmerman conducted a cross-sectional study in which he regressed the 
log of per capita income on the percentage of the labor force employed in 
nonprimary (secondary and tertiary) sectors for a number of economic-
geographic regions and various points in time. He found the relationship 
log y = 0.0202% V 1.3235, with a high correlation (R=0.92). This, however, 
does not imply causation. As Zimmerman indicates, a country need not be 
poor because a large portion of the population is in the agricultural 
sector. See Zimmerman (67, ch. 3). Conversely, industrialization and the 
accompanying structural changes are neither necessary nor sufficient condi­
tions for increasing per capita incomes. Viner (62, ch. 3) is very critica 
of this type of argument, which Ruttan (53, p. 19) has called the structura 
transformation hypothesis. 
3 
See, for example, Kuznets (30, pp. 43-53). 
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many leaders as a natural economic structure for a large underdeveloped 
country to emulate. The Soviet successes in developmental planning are 
very persuasive to the leaders in many of th^ce countries. ' 
Perhaps one of the more compelling and logically tenable reasons for 
industrialization in many developing countries is the prospect of earning 
inadequate foreign exchange from traditional exports to import the required 
manufactured goods. Bhagwati suggests that^ "It is possible to argue that 
poor countries should continue producing primary products only if it can be 
established that they could always earn enough foreign exchange to import 
their manufactures. where this is not so, industrialization is a rational 
consequence" (3, p. 165), The implicit assumption in this argument is that 
industrialization will improve the balance of payments position either 
through import substitution or expanding exports.^ However, Myrdal suggests 
that, "Import substitution may ease the foreign exchange position in the 
long run, but in the short run it usually aggravates it" (41, p. 1161). 
This is because short run imports of capital goods are usually required 
to establish import-substitution industries. 
This argument suffers from the same logical weakness as the structural 
transformation hypothesis. Success with this method in the Soviet Union does 
not mean repeating the same process elsewhere will produce similar results. 
^Bhagwati uses the following example to illustrate the necessity of 
investing in heavy industry (such as steel plants). If a country wants to 
invest $250 million in plant and equipment (e.g., tractors and fertilizer 
plants) in a particular year, but only expects to earn $100 million in 
foreign exchange, the only possibility for carrying out the investment pro­
gram is to produce the necessary plant and equipment (3, p. 166-168). In 
this example, there is an implicit assumption that using the limited foreign 
exchange earnings to establish heavy industry will allow the investment 
program to be successfully executed. 
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Another often cited reason in. favor of industrialization is that this 
will raise the productivity of the labor force. There is evidence to 
suggest that the product per worker in the agricultural sector is below the 
product per worker for the economy as a whole in both developed and under­
developed countries. However, the disparity in the less-developed nations 
6 
appears to be greater. Thus, industrialization has a direct effect on 
productivity by increasing the portion of the labor force in the more pro­
ductive nonagricultural sectors. An additional indirect influence on pro­
ductivity is presumably realized since agriculture is subject to diminishing 
returns because of fixed land resources. Hence, transferring labor out of 
agriculture reduces the labor/land ratio and thereby permits an additional 
productivity increase. The limiting case in this argument is when there is 
assumed to be so much labor in the agricultural sector that its marginal 
physical productivity is zero. The implication of this is that labor can be 
withdrawn from the agricultural sector without a concomitant reduction in 
agricultural production. The assumed pool of redundant labor in the agri­
cultural sector in the form of disguised unemployment led to great optimism 
See, for example, the works by Bellerby (2) and Kuznets (29, pp. 415-
417). Kuznets makes the additional observation that the ratio of population 
to labor force in the agricultural sector is higher than for the nonagricul­
tural sectors. Consequently, the disparity of product per capita between 
the sectors is even greater than the disparity product per worker. Myrdal 
(41; p. 1137) points out that since the capital/labor ratio in manufacturing 
is usually higher than in traditional agriculture there is some question 
concerning the meaning of comparisons of product per worker between 
manufacturing and agriculture. 
6 
7 for developmental possibilities during the 1950's. 
Closely related to the productivity argument is the view that 
industrialization will create new jobs and result in employment for 
unemployed members of the labor force. Providing new jobs is considered 
to be extremely important in many less-developed nations since the labor 
force is expanding very rapidly. Widespread unemployment or underemployment 
is frequently believed to be the result of the failure of capital and most 
complementary means of production to increase at the same rate as the 
supply of labor in secondary and tertiary activities.^ The proposed 
solution is to increase the rate of capital accumulation thereby increasing 
the number of jobs. While employment creation is frequently used as an 
argument in favor of industrialization, it is widely recognized that the 
number of jobs created is usually not sufficient to absorb the natural 
increase in the labor force. The reason is that the base from which 
'The implications for the development of an economy with "surplus 
labor" in the sense of zero marginal physical productivity of labor in the 
subsistence sectors was first discussed by Lewis (33). There has been a 
great deal of controversy over the assumption of surplus labor. After 
surveying the relevant literature, Kao, Anschel and Sicher conclude that, 
"To date, there is little reliable empirical evidence to support the exis­
tence of more than token - five percent - disguised unemployment in under­
developed countries as defined by a zero marginal product of labor and the 
condition of ceteris paribus" (26, p. 141). 
g 
See, for example, Navarrete and Navarrete (42). Under strictly 
neoclassical assumptions with flexible wage rates and prices, there is no 
reason for any labor to be unemployed even with a rapidly expanding labor 
force. For an excellent analysis of why unemployment may continue to 
persist in less-developed economies, see Eckaus (9). 
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industrial employment starts is very small relative to the total labor 
9 
force. 
Another view holds industrialization to be crucial to development 
because it will radiate stimuli throughout the economy. Establishment of 
industry A will generate a demand for certain inputs which are not 
domestically produced because of insufficient demand. However, the addi­
tional demand resulting from the establishment of industry A provides an 
incentive to establish an import substitution industry. This stimulus has 
become known as a backward linkage. In addition to baclcward linkages, 
forward linkages or stimuli may also be operative if industry A produces 
products which require farther processing. 
A second type of stimulus has also been cited as an argument in favor 
of industrialization. The increased incomes generated by the establishment 
of new industries leads to increased demands for consumer goods which will 
Myrdal cites several statements from che development plans of Burma, 
India, Pakistan and Ceylon indicating the awareness of the planning 
authorities in those countries that industrialization does not create very 
many new jobs. In addition to not creating many new positions, industrial­
ization also tends to have "backwash" effects on existing industry, 
especially cottage industry. Myrdal concludes that although the estimates 
made by the planners are crudean important conclusion about the 
employment-creating potential of industrial expansion can be sustained by 
the statistical calculations of governments - namely, that industrial 
expansion, when beginning from.a low base, cannot directly have more than a 
peripheral uplifting effect on (occupational) participation ratios during 
a very considerable early period" (41, p. 1199). See also pages 1172-1205. 
^^An extensive discussion of the importance and nature of linkages can 
be found in Hirschman (18). Regarding the industrialization issue, 
Hirschman concludes that agriculture in general and subsistence agriculture 
in particular have very weak linkage effects and that "....the superiority 
of manufacturing in this respect is crushing. This may yet be the most 
important reason militating against any complete specialization of under­
developed countries in primary production"' (18, p. 110). 
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result in expanded markets and, hence, provide additional profitable 
investment opportunities. Considerations of this type have been used to 
argue that it is desirable and perhaps even necessary to initiate invest­
ment in a number of industries at the same time since this will make invest­
ments in the individual industries more profitable. This has become known 
11 
as the balanced growth argument. 
The increased income associated with industrialization is supposed to 
have an additional positive feature. Specifically, with higher income 
levels the volume of savings is expected to be larger and, hence, additional 
investments will become progressively easier. This will be particularly 
true if, as is often assumed, the saving rate rises as per capita incomes 
1 2  
rise, 
Sometimes the case for industrialization is argued on the basis of 
political arguments. For example, a country may decide to industrialize 
even if it appears that it can continue as a primary producer and rely on 
trade for imports of manufactured consumer and capital goods. Two reasons 
are frequently cited for doing so. The first of these is that, in the 
interests of national security, a certain amount of self-sufficiency in 
manufactured and capital goods production may be desirable during a 
Many versions of the balanced growth argument have been presented. 
The "demand" version was first discussed by Rosenstein-Rodan (50) and later 
popularized by Nurkse (45). For a criticism of the balanced growth argu­
ment, see Hirschman (18, Ch. 3). 
12 
The importance of this point has been emphasized by many writers. 
For example, Rostow (51, p. 281) regards raising die net saving rate in 
less-developed countries to over ten percent of national income as a 
necessary (but not sufficient) condition for take-off into self-sustained 
growth. See also Lewis (33, p. 155). 
9 
political crisiso A second reason given is that in many newly independent 
countries there is a strong desire to reverse the colonial economic pattern 
which frequently involved producing primary products for export, and 
perhaps some manufacturing of consumer goods for local consumption. This 
pattern is believed to have evolved largely as the result of the laissez-
faire policies pursued by the colonialists in assigning the colonies the 
roles of suppliers of raw materials and consumers of manufactured products.^ 
Thus? many countries place heavy emphasis on industrialization in their 
, 14 
aeveiopmenc plans. 
The importance of social and cultural characteristics in economic 
development is widely recognised. It is sometimes argued that industrial­
ization tends to condition cultural values in a manner that will be condu­
cive to further development. The idea is that industrialization will 
modernize the outlook of the individuals affected and create a more 
suitable environment for technological progress. 
ThuS; a milieu of economic, sociological, political and historical 
factors may interact to make industrialization a desirable policy. This 
does not J however, make industrialization imperative. There may well be 
certain underdeveloped countries that will find it profitable to continue 
__ 
Myrdal (41, pp. 1151-1152) refers to this as the Communist doctrine 
of colonial exploitation, 
^^The failure of industry to develop under laissez-faire policies is 
one of the arguments which have been advanced to justify development 
planning. See Meier (37, Gh. 8). 
^^An interesting attempt to empirically identify the relative impor­
tance of certain social and political elements on the potential for 
economic development has been made by Adelman and Morris (1). 
10 
to specialize in traditional and primary production. In the following 
section, some of the reasons favoring agricultural development are reviewed. 
Agricultural development 
Perhaps the most obvious reason for emphasizing the development of 
agriculture in less-developed economies is the contribution this will 
make to the growth of total and per capita product. This is particularly 
important since in many less-developed economies, agriculture frequently 
contributes from 40 to 50 percent of the net output while employing over 
one-half of the labor force.Thus, if agricultural output does not 
increase, the rate of growth of national income ^vill fall short of the rate 
of growth of nonagricultural income. With the advent of the green revolu­
tion in agriculture, the possibilities for tremendous increases in agricul­
tural productivity and output has led to increased emphasis of agriculture 
17 
as a source of growth. Also, failure to increase productivity in agri­
culture will tend to skew the Lorenz curve even further unless the creation 
of employment opportunities in nonagricultural persuits permits sufficient 
migration of labor out of agriculture to offset these productivity 
Kuznets presents data for 1958 which indicate that for twelve 
countries with gross domestic product less than $200 per capita, 46 
percent of the product originated from agriculture and related industries 
while employing 57.6 percent of the labor force (29, p. 402). Myrdal 
presents similar data for various low income countries in Asia. For 
example, during the 1954-56 period, 57 percent of the income in Pakistan 
originated from agriculture while employing 71 percent of the labor force. 
The analogous figures for South Vietnam indicate that 82 percent of the 
labor force was employed in the agricultural sector but this sector only 
contributed 34 percent of the income (41, p. 494). 
^^Mellor (39) exhibits great enthusiasm over the developmental pros­
pects afforded by the green revolution, A more balanced viewpoint is 




A second type of benefit arising from agricultural development is 
the various stimuli to the nonagricultural sectors resulting from increase 
demand for manufactured goods. These increased demands provide an oppor­
tunity for other sectors to develop and have been designated as market 
19 
contributions. Market contributions are essentially of tvw types. The 
development of agriculture is usually characterized by an increase in the 
demand for off-farm purchases such as fertilizers and insecticides. This 
provides stimuli to develop those industries. The second type of market 
contribution is the increased demand for consumer goods by workers in the 
agricultural sector resulting from the increased incomes of these workers. 
The process of economic development usually results in severe strains 
on the balance of payments. Primary exports are frequently the principal 
source of foreign exchange earnings in less-developed countries. In many 
cases, expansion of agricultural output can contribute significantly to 
easing of the balance of payments constraint through the expansion of 
The disparity between agricultural and nonagricultural incomes is 
not limited to today's less-developed countries. This disparity persists 
in modern developed nations and has existed during the earlier phases of 
their development. See Bellerby (2). 
1 9 
Kuznets (28, p. 63). 
20 
The strength and importance of these stimuli to the industrial 
sectors will depend on, among other things, the size of the market created 
and the seriousness of the balance of payments situation. The establish­
ment of one or more supply (or consumer goods) industries may also have 
second round effects through various linkages (see above) stimulating 
the establishment of satellite industries. 
12 
exports if the country is in a food surplus situation, or through import 
21 
substitution if the country is in a food deficit situation. 
The development of an investable agricultural surplus also contributes 
to general economic development through the factors which may be provided 
22 
to the nonagricultural sectors. Two types of factors are generally con­
sidered. Firstly, an agricultural surplus provides capital, or more 
correctly, funds for the purchase of material capital goods by the non-
agricultural sectors. In a free enterprise system, this capital can be 
transferred through either taxation or in the form of private savings. 
Kuznets (28, p. 69) suggests the burden of taxation on the agricultural 
sector frequently exceeds the extent of the services provided to the 
agricultural sector by government spending. The residual benefits accrue 
to nonagricultural sectors either in the form of social overhead capital or 
23 
a subsidy to a particular industry or industries. private savings may be 
used to finance the purchase of essential capital goods in nonagricultural 
21_ 
industrialization in the absence of agricultural development will 
lead to increased strains on the balance of payments in the short run for 
at least two reasons. Firstly, industrialization requires the import of 
vital capital goods which must be financed through either capital inflows 
or exports. Secondly, as higher proportions of labor move to nonagricul­
tural employment, increased food is required to feed the nonagricultural 
population which must be imported or deducted from the exportable surplus 
if the economy is a food exporter. 
2 2  
Nicholls (43) discusses the concept of an agricultural surplus and 
its potential contributions to development. 
23 
Mellor suggests that the central issue in agricultural developmental 
policy is "what level of taxes or other means of capital transfer can be 
placed on the agricultural sector and under what circumstances?" (40, 
p. 27). Schultz thinks Mellor goes too far in his taxation proposals (56). 
13 
2b. 
sectors, either through lending or direct investment. 
The second type of factor which is provided is labor. The release of 
labor from the need to produce food is possible only when a marketable 
surplus of food is being produced. The transfer of labor implicitly 
involves a transfer of capital in the form of human capital since the 
agricultural sector has financed the rearing and training to maturity of 
any migrating laborers. In earlier discussions of development, the pro­
vision of labor for industrialization was considered to be one of the 
principal contributions of the agricultural sector in the earlier phases 
25 
of development. The emphasis now appears to be shifting to providing 
employment for the rapidly expanding labor force. 
Economic historians have compiled considerable evidence on the 
"necessity" for increases in agricultural productivity to sustain economic 
growth. In this connection, Kuznets concludes that "....an agricultural 
Owen (47) discusses another type of forced intersectoral transfer of 
agricultural surplus which arises from the asymmetric market structures 
existing in the farm sector (competitive) and the farm supply and processing 
sectors (monopolistic and monopsonistic). Owen argues this market structure 
leads to an efficient means of intersectoral taxation since the farm supply 
and processing sectors manage to extract any profits arising from produc­
tivity increases in agriculture. These profits accrue to these farm supply 
and processing industries where they can be used for capital accumulation. 
Owen also discusses the extraction of the agricultural surplus in the 
"Communist" model of development. 
25 
See, for example, Lewis (33) and Johnston and Mellor (22). 
^^Compare the change in emphasis between Johnston and Mellor (22) and 
Johnston and Cownie (21). See also the recent articles by Todaro (51) and 
Harris and Todaro (16) which suggest the current interest appears to be 
more concerned with providing employment rather than releasing additional 
labor from agriculture. 
revolution - a marked rise in productivity per worker in agriculture - is 
a precondition of the industrial revolution for any sizeable region in the 
27 
world." Based on a review of the historical development of a number of 
nations, Nicholls reached a very similar conclusion when he stated that 
"....until underdeveloped countries succeed in achieving and sustaining 
(either through domestic production or imports) a reliable food surplus, 
they have not fulfilled the fundamental precondition for economic develop­
ment" (44, pp. 366-367). Eicher and Witt go so far as to state that 
"Economic historians generally concur that there are no cases of successful 
development of a major country in which a rise in agricultural productivity 
did not precede or accompany industrial development" (10, p. 8). 
Based on the preceding summary it is apparent that the issue of 
industrialization versus agricultural development has not been resolved. 
Agreement probably will never be unanimous regarding the "best" route to 
development. The general trend in the literature appears to be evolving 
toward the view that there are certain complementarities between agricul­
ture and industry which should be exploited. Essentially, it is the purpose 
of this study to investigate the agriculture-industrialization issue. In 
the following section, several alternative methods of investigation are 
discussed. This is followed by a section outlining the specific objectives 
of this study. 
27 
Kuznets (30, pp. 59-60). in another statement, he suggests that 
"One may conclude that a substantial rise in productivity of resources in 
the domestic agriculture sector is a condition of the large increase in 
overall productivity in modern economic growrh" (29, p. 120). 
Alternative Methods of Investigation 
Three alternative approaches to the investigation of the industrial­
ization-agricultural development issue are briefly discussed in this 
section. These are the interdisciplinary approach., the examination of 
economic history, and development theory. 
Interdisciplinary approach 
It has been uidely acknowledged by economists that cultural, social, 
psychological and political factors are extremely crucial elements in the 
developmental process. Unfortunately, these factors are too frequently 
simply dismissed as necessary "preconditions" for economic development or 
28 
given a very superficial treatment. Whyte and Williams suggest that a 
major obstacle to conceptual integration of development research by 
economists and other social scientists is the difference in case size. 
"The economist generally focuses his analysis at the level of the nation, 
the economy as a whole, or some nationwide sector (the agricultural secto 
for example). .«..Sociologists, anthropologists and psychologists 
occasionally give attention to the national level, but their studies are 
more often concentrated on the behavior of particular individuals, groups 
28 
See, for example, Tinbergen (60, pp. 3-4) and Rostow (51, p. 11). 
Hoselitz (19, p. 53ff) suggests the preconditions that Western economists 
have in mind all too frequently are based on the type of socio-political 




organizations and communities." 
The issue of industrialization and agricultural development has 
been discussed almost exclusively at highly aggregate levels, most fre­
quently on national levels. Most of the discussions of noneconomic con­
siderations have involved the socio-economic implications of urbanization 
and transformation concomitant with industrialization. For example, Lewis 
(33, p. 159) discusses the need for the emergence of a new class of people, 
the capitalists. Essentially, very few discussions of the industrializa­
tion-agricultural development issue have considered the noneconomic aspects 
of the problem in any detail. 
Perhaps the most important contributions from an interdisciplinary 
approach to problems of development are to be made in the area of micro-
dynamics. Sociological and psychological factors are often cited as 
30 
barriers to change. Investigations of the problem of relaxing these 
barriers and getting people to adopt new techniques and means of production 
and trade and to accept other changes essential to development are best 
analyzed through an interdisciplinary approach. Economic incentives to 
change may be considered as necessary but not sufficient to motivate 
people in many instances involving socio-cultural factors. While inter­
disciplinary research on developmental problems is urgently required, at 
29 
Whyte and Williams (65, pp. 3-4). This allegation regarding the 
case size for economists appears to overlook a number of microeconomic 
studies relating to peasant agriculture. See, for example. Sen (58) and 
Georgescu-Roegen (15). It appears that the best prospects for theoretical 
integration are at the microeconomic level where the actions and attitudes 
of individuals can be studied. However, most of the studies relevant to 
the present investigation appear to be highly-aggregated, nationwide 
studies. 
30 
See, for example, Brewster (5). 
17 
present there appears to be little prospect of shedding much light on the 
agricultural development-industrialization issue via this approsch^ 
Economic history and growth stage generalizations 
The recent interest in economic history has been aroused, at least in 
part, by Rostow's revival of the concept of stages of economic growth. 
Ruttan has recently reviewed the historical development of the concepts of 
31 
stages and evaluates their potential contribution to policy. 
Ruttan differentiates stage theories into three classes which he 
terms industrial fundamentalism (associated with F. List), structural 
transformation (A. G. B. Fisher and C. Clark) and leading sectors O'L W. 
Rostow). Ruttan concludes that "All three stage theories....treat the 
transition from an agricultural to the industrial society as a major 
problem of development policy. Rostow's system is, however, the only one 
which clearly specifies a role for the agricultural sector in the transition 
process" (53, p. 22). 
In his evaluation of the contributions of the stage theories to 
development policy, Ruttan reaches several conclusions which are pertinent 
to the present study. These are: 
1. Clearly Rostow®s leading sector model and the agricultural 
development approaches have helped focus attention on the critical 
role of the agricultural sector in the development process. 
Although agriculture may not contribute as a leading sector, over 
long periods, the historical record is consistent with the 
proposition that failure to achieve a technically progressive 
agriculture can dampen the whole process of economic growth.... 
2. The leading sector concept does add a potentially useful tool 
to our analytical capacity..., 
^"See Ruttan (53, 54). 
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3. The basic limitation of the growth stage approach when 
employed as a guide to development policy is that it substitutes 
a search for economic doctrine in the form of historical 
generalizations 3 for the development of analytical power.... 
Policy prescriptions based on generalizations from a limited 
historical sample should....be based on observations drawn 
from the same "population'"..,. 
4. ....emphasis on the "take-off" and the differentiation of 
"stages" in both the general and agricultural stage approaches 
represents a "blind alley".... 
5. . . . a  taxanomic scheme, utilizing growth stages as labels 
in its filing system, may represent a potential contribution 
to the analysis of economic development (53, pp. 32-33). 
Other writers have also expressed dissatisfaction with historical 
32 
generalizations and growth stage theories. However, the criticisms of 
Ruttan appear to be most relevant for the present study. In particular, 
the lack of analytical power resulting from this approach appears to 
preclude the "historical" approach in the present study. 
Dual-economy models 
The third approach to the problem, and the one adopted in this study, 
is through the use of specialized general equilibrium models known as 
33 
dual-economy models. The term dual-economy arises from the fact that 
"For criticisms of Rostow's version of growth stages, see the papers 
by Kuznets, Gerschenkron, Solow and others in Rostow (52). Lewis (34, p„ 
15) discusses some of the problems associated with historical generaliza­
tions o 
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Ruttan (54) differentiates dualism into two types: static and 
dynamic. Static dualism, which includes sociological dualism and enclave 
dualism, relates primarily to the cultural and technological characteristics 
prevailing in many less-developed countries. Ruttan suggests that these 
technological and cultural characteristics are the basis for many of the 
assumptions made in the dynamic dual-economy models. This section deals 
with the models Ruttan has classed as dynamic. 
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economic activity in many less-developed nations can be divided into two 
distinct types of sectors. Various names have been given to these sectors 
such as the capitalist and the subsistence sectors^^' the advanced or 
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modern sector and the backward or traditional sector, and the industrial 
and agricultural sectors. 
The analysis of less-developed countries through the use of dual-
economy models originates with the classic work of LeX'?is (33, 35) and has 
been extended by Jorgenson (23, 24, 25) and Fei and Ranis (12, 13, 14, 
49). 
^Lewis (33; p. 146). The capitalist sector is defined as "that part 
of the economy which uses reproducible capital and pays capitalists for the 
use thereof.... The subsistence sector is by difference all that part of 
the economy which is not using reproducible capital" (33, pp. 146-147). 
By these definitions, the subsistence sector would include the majority 
of services. 
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Jorgenson (23, p. 311), "The economic system may be divided into 
two sectors - the advanced or modern sector, which we will call, somewhat 
inaccurately, the manufacturing sector, and the backward or traditional 
scctor, which may suggestively be denoted agriculture." 
^^Ranis and Fei use these terms as short-hand terminology for Lewis' 
capitalist and subsistence sectors but "....underscore the absence of any 
necessary one-to-one relationship between the subsistence sector and 
agriculture, or between the capitalist sector and industry...." (49, p. 
534). In their later work they fail to mention this qualification (12, 
p. 4). 
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Ruttan (54) considers the work by Lewis to be a bridge between 
static and dynamic dualism. The reason for this is unclear since Lewis' 
model is definitely dynamic, although not rigorously and explicitly 
specified as the models in the works of Jorgenson and Fei and Ranis. 
Also, there is some question about whether Fei and Ranis or Jorgenson 
contribute much besides rigor to the analysis of Lewis. With rigor, 
however, there are inevitably more stringent simplifying assumptions, some 
of which are rather difficult to accept. In the words of Lewis in 
commenting on the work of Fei and Ranis, "The mathematics seems impeccable; 
it is the assumptions that are odd.... One must pay tribute to the 
geometrical ingenuity that makes it possible to bring so many variables 
into a stagnant equilibrium. But of course, the value of a model is in 
direct proportion to its relationship to reality" (32, pp. 159-161). 
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The models developed by these researchers will not be reviewed in any 
detail at this point. The relationship between these models and the models 
developed in this study will be indicated in later chapters. However^ 
three shortcomings common to the models of Lewisj Fei and Ranis^ and 
Jorgenson will be indicated. Some additional shortcomings have been 
discussed by Ruttan (54, 55). 
Perhaps the most serious shortcoming of these models is the neglect 
of the intersectoral markets for factors. Only labor is considered in 
intersectoral factor trade. In the light of the recent green revolution 
in agriculture with its high productivity response to agricultural inputs 
such as fertilizers and chemical pesticides, ignoring intersectoral factor 
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trade appears to be somewhat unrealistic. 
A second shortcoming common to these studies is the asymmetric treat­
ment of the investment problem. All studies arrive at the conclusion that 
an agricultural surplus is a necessary condition for sustained develop-
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ment, and all emphasize the contribution made by this surplus to capital 
accumulation. Only Fei and Ranis, however, consider the desirability of 
38 
As mentioned above, Kuznets (28) and others have indicated demand 
for manufactured inputs is one of agriculture's "contributions" to 
economic development, 
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Jorgenson (23, p. 324) and Lewis (33, p. 173). Fei and Ranis 
actually argue that "balanced" growth between agriculture and industry is 
desirable (14, p. 190). Nicholls (43) also demonstrates the importance 
of an agricultural surplus. It should be emphasized that all these 
demonstrations depend crucially on the assumption of a closed economy. 
Only Lewis and Nicholls, however, appear to recognize the limitation of 
their conclusion. 
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investment in the agricultural sector. This consideration is not sub­
jected to the same rigorous analysis as investment in the industrial 
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sector.'' Given the supposed importance of the development of the agri­
cultural sector, a reasonable pair of questions to ask seem to be the 
following: Should there be a net inflow of savings into the agricultural 
sector in the earlier stages of development? Under what conditions does 
this tend to be desirable? None of the above researchers appear to have 
analyzed these questions, or even posed them. 
The third common shortcoming of these dual-economy models is the 
lack of analysis of the role of the government in the developmental pro­
cess. It is now widely recognized that the government's role in less-
developed countries is extremely important. This is evidenced by the 
widespread use of development planning in an effort to speed the process 
of development.^^ 
The literature suggests the appropriate relationship between the 
agricultural and nonagricultural sectors in economic development is still 
an open question although in the minds of some it appears to be closed. 
We now turn to a statement of the objectives of this study. 
Their discussions of investment in agriculture seem to take on the 
appearance of an afterthought. For example, in the formal model presented 
on pages 28 and 29 in (12), no allowance is made for investment in agri­
culture. Then they suggest that "The mutually beneficial relationship 
between the industrial and agricultural sectors of the dualistic economy 
is due to the fact that, from the viewpoint of the agricultural sector 
'access to the industrial sector' stimulates agricultural productivity 
and from the viewpoint of the industrial sector, 'access to the agricul­
tural sector' increases the savings fund" (12, p. 34). A logical question 
is to enquire how productivity is "stimulated" in the absence of any real 
resource demands. 
4] 
For a list of countries which have formulated national plans, see 
waterston (63, Appendix III). 
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Objectives and Organization of the Study 
The general purpose of this study is to investigate the inter­
relationships between the agricultural and nonagricuJ.tural sectors during 
the process of economic development.In addition, the following specific 
objectives may be enumerated: 
1. To develop a rigorous theoretical model encompassing as many 
agricultural-nonagricultural intersectoral relationships as consistent 
with operationalism. 
2. To incorporate into this model as much realism or empirical 
relevance as possible within a rigorous, operational framework, 
3. To include the government as an integrated entity in this model. 
4. To analyze the allocation of private and public (government) 
savings between the agricultural and nonagricultural sectors. 
5. To investigate whether, and under what conditions, it would be 
desirable to have a net inflow of savings into the agricultural sector. 
6. To analyze the impact of commodity aid, and, in particular, food 
aid on the investment priorities within the economy. 
In addition to gaining some insight to the problems listed in the 
foregoing objectives, numerous other results are obtained during the 
analysis. These are discussed throughout the study. 
Chapter II is devoted almost exclusively to the formulation of a 
model termed the decentralized model for reasons that will become obvious. 
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To some extent this purpose has already been fulfilled by the pre­
ceding, incomplete review of the literature pertaining to this problem. 
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The model developed is an optimizing model and the optimizing technique 
is discussed in Chapter III. After a preliminary analysis of the 
optimum conditions, it is concluded that the model can be simplified by 
a reformulation in a centralized-economy framework with results very 
similar to those obtained for a decentralized economy. In addition, a 
number of highly restrictive and unrealistic assumptions are relaxed 
through this reformulation. 
The centralized model is developed and extensively analyzed in 
Chapter IV. It is in that chapter that many of the objectives of the 
study are fulfilled. The impact of foreign aid is analyzed in Chapter V, 
and Chapter VI is devoted to an investigation of the implications of 
relaxing some of the assumptions that underlie most of the study. Finally, 
Chapter VII provides a summary of the conclusions of the study. 
CHAPTER lïo THE DECENTRALIZED MODEL 
The models developed in this study are more elaborate than most 
models used to study the development of dualistic economies. This 
elaborateness is a result of the emphasis placed on the investigation of 
intersectoral factor, product, and income flows. The investigation pro­
ceeds in terms of a closed economy. 
Intersectoral factor flows of labor^ capital^ and manufactured goods 
are examined in a five sector optimizing model involving three products^ 
agricultural goods, manufactured goods, and capital goods. Agricultural 
goods which are assumed to be produced in two sectorsj a subsistence and 
a commercial sector, are used only for consumption purposes. The agricul­
tural goods produced by these two sectors are perfect substitutes in con­
sumption and consequently only one price exists for the output from these 
two sectors. 
Capital goods are produced by the third sector in the model. 
Capital goods are used only as factors of production and are assumed to 
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be infinitely durable. The fourth sector in the model produces the 
third product, manufactured goods, which may be used either for consump-
46. 
tion or as nondurable factors of production. Manufactured goods to be 
•\hat is, depreciation is not included in the model. This is only 
a simplifying assumption and is not necessary to the analysis. There is 
no reason to suspect any of the conclusions of this study would be 
appreciably altered by relaxing this assumption. 
A nondurable factor of production is one which is completely used 
up in production during the period of purchase. 
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used either as factors of production in other sectors or as consumer 
goods are assumed to be perfect substitutes in production. In other 
words, manufactured consumer goods and nondurable manufactured factors 
of production (manufactured inputs) are produced by the same firms using 
the "same" production processes. These firms are assumed to be 
indifferent between producing consumer goods or manufactured inputs which 
leads to a common price for manufactured consumer goods and manufactured 
inputs . 
The fifth sector included in the model is the government sector. 
The government has at its disposal the instruments of government expendi­
ture. Taxes are collected on all income. This tax revenue is used to 
invest in social overhead capital for agriculture or in capital accumula­
tion in the manufacturing or capital goods sectors. The government is 
assumed to invest in these alternatives in a manner that tends to maximize 
social welfare over a finite horizon, where welfare is assumed to be a 
function of consumption only. 
For simplicity, the supply of labor is assumed to be perfectly 
inelastic throughout the period.Labor employed by the government, 
in the commercial agricultural sector, manufacturing sector, or the 
Zj-G 
capital goods sector receives an exogenously fixed wage rate. This 
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The implications of relaxing this assumption are investigated in 
Chapter VI. 
Various reasons for rigid wage rate can be given. Perhaps the 
least objectionable and most plausible reason is that the laborers are 
organized in a union and restrict membership to maintain this wage rate. 
Other possible explanations include social legislation and unwillingness 
to work in other than traditional employment at a lower wage rate. 
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wage rate is assumed to be too high to allow all labor to be employed in 
the three advanced sectors at that wage rate since these sectors are 
assumed to behave competitively and all factors must earn their marginal 
value productivity. Any labor which is not employed in the advanced 
sectors finds employment in the subsistence sector where an average 
productivity is earned. The subsistence wage rate is assumed to be lower 
than the wage rate in the advanced sectors which, in effect, makes the 
supply of labor to the advanced sectors perfectly elastic in the initial 
phases of development even though the entire labor supply is assumed to 
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be perfectly inelastic. 
Notation 
Throughout this study, the following convention on notation is used. 
All variables are denoted by upper case Latin letters= Lower case Latin 
letters and Arabic numerals are subscripts either on variables or para­
meters. Parameters are denoted by Greek letters. All parameters, indexes 
As explained in the following sections, the marginal physical 
productivity of labor in the subsistence sector is never assumed to be 
zero. This appears to coincide with the evidence cited by Kao, Anschel 
and Eicher (26). Thus, withdrawing labor from the subsistence sector 
tends to reduce production in this sector and we are following 
Jorgenson (23) in this respect. However, a perfectly elastic labor 
supply curve to the advanced sectors coincides with the assumptions of 
Lewis (33) and Fei and Ranis (14). Jorgenson (24, 25) made an interesting 
attempt to test the appropriateness of the assumptions of zero versus 
positive marginal physical productivity of labor and concluded that, for 
the case of Japan, the data were consistent with a positive marginal 
physical productivity for labor. As Marglin (36) demonstrates, however, 
Jorgenson's test depends crucially on the assumption of unitary 
elasticity of substitution between labor and capital in the industrial 
sector. 
27 
and variables are nonnegative unless otherwise indicated. Subscripts on 
variables refer to the following: 
s = subsistence agricultural sector. 
1 = commercial agricultural sector. 
2 = manufacturing sector. 
3 = capital goods sector, 
t = time period (discrete). 
The variables are defined as follows: 
= production of good i, (i = s, 1, 2, 3), 
F . =  u s e  o f  m a n u f a c t u r e d  g o o d s  ( o r i g i n a t i n g  f r o m  s e c t o r  2 )  
as a factor of production in sector i, (i - s, 1, 2, 3). 
= consumption of good i, where i = 1 denotes agricultural 
goods and i = 2 denotes manufactured goods. 
= capital stock in sector i available for production 
during period t, (i = 1, 2, 3), 
= labor employed in sector i, (i = s, I, 2, 3). 
= labor employed by the government in the accumulation of 
social overhead capital (SOC) in sector i, (i = s, 1), 
= price of good i, (i = 1, 2, 3) and 
= private capital accumulation in sector i, (i = 1, 2, 3). 
I^ = public or government capital accumulation in sector i, 
(i = 2, 3)o 
= level of SOC in sector i, (i = s, 1). 
E = government expenditure in sector i, (i = s^ 1, 2, 3), 
= amount of land in sector i, (i = s, 1). 
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M,_ = tax receipts in period t. 
= Lagrangean multiplier corresponding to the i-th constraint 
in period t. 
The parameters are defined as follows: 
Mt 5 M2' 1^11' ^12' ^21' 1^22 parameters of the quadratic 
welfare function and will be discussed in detail below. 
= "intercepts" of the Cobb-Douglas form of production 
function sector i, (i = s, 1^ 2, 3). 
A = "elasticity of production" of SOC in the agricultural 
sectors. 
w = institutionally fixed wage rate in terms of manufactured 
goods. 
= elasticity of production of factor j, sector s, (j = 1, 2, 4). 
g = elasticity of production of factor j, sector 1, 
(j = 1; 2, 3, 4). 
Yj = elasticity of production of factor j, sector 2, (j = 1, 2, 3). 
5 = elasticity of production of factor j, sector 3, (j = 1, 2, 3). 
where j = 1 refers to manufactured inputsj j = 2 refers to 
labor inputs, j = 3 refers to capital inputsj and j = 4 refers 
to land inputs. 
T = terminal period of the plan (i.e., t = 0, 1, x), 
e = exogenous rate of technological change in the manufacturing 
and capital goods sectors. 
\p = marginal (= average) tax rate. 
0 = social discount rate on welfare. 
The foregoing notation refers to the decentralized model. Sonia 
modifications and additional variables are introduced with the central­
ized model in Chapter IV„ With the aid of this notation, the formal 
model is introduced and the various assumptions are discussed. The nature 
of the welfare function is considered in the following section. 
The Welfare Function 
Welfare in. any one period is considered to be a quadratic function 
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of aggregate consumption of manufactured and agricultural goods. it 
is assumed that the objective of the government is to maximize this 
welfare function over a finite horizon of t periods, with welfare in 
future periods discounted to the present at the constant rate. That is, 
the objective is to maximize 
 ^  ^ ^^ I'^ lt ^2^2t ~ l^l^ It ''' 1^2^ 1t'^ 2t • t=l 
This welfare function is assumed to have the following character­
istics. In any period t, the marginal welfare of increased consumption 
is positive; 
^ ^ > 0' (2.2) 
and 
It 
" ("2 + P) ^ > 0' (2.3) 
Since the labor force (and population) is assumed to be constant, 
by virtue of the nature of the product and income distribution assump­
tions, this is equivalent to maximizing a weighted average per capita 
consumption, where all subsistence employees consume at one rate and all 
advanced sector employees consume at another (higher) rate. The weights 
in the average are the proportions of the labor force employed in the 
subsistence and advanced sectors. 
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Without loss of generality, consumption units can be chosen so that 
= C^Q = lo The relative magnitudes of the various parameters of V 
are assumed to be such that ^ ^2 W. 2W, That is. 
12 22' 
in the initial period a marginal increment in food consumption will con­
tribute more to welfare than a similar increment in nonfood consumption. 
It is further assumed that and 2U^^ > ^^22 ^ *^12 ^ This implies 
that 9^/= -2u^^ < S^V/SC^,. = -2^22 -bat is, the marginal 
welfare obtained from additional increments of food decreases at a more 
rapid rate than marginal welfare from additional units of nonfood con­
sumption. The foregoing assumptions also imply that agricultural and 
manufactured goods are complementary in consumption and that the welfare 
function is positive definite. 
Every negative definite quadratic form has an unconstrained maximum 
which is defined by the first order conditions» In the case of (2.1), 
the values of the variables and at the optimum are given by setting 
(2.2) and (2.3) equal to zero and solving. The unconstrained maximum is 
given by the system 
'Cl' 






where D = ~ ^12 ^ readily be shown that given 
the assumption that p^/w2 < (2w^^ - ^12'^ ~ ^12^ addition to the 
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assumptions listed above. This implies that at the "saturation point" 
^^From (2.4) we have DC^ = 2^22^1 ^12^2 ^*^2 ~ *^12*^1 ^^11^2° 
Differencing and collecting terms we get (DC^ - DC ) = ^^(2^22 " *^12^ ~ 
- p.2)° Dividing by the positive quantity ^2(2^22 " ^ 12^ see 
that (DC- - DC^)/y^(2p22 " - (2y„ - y,^)/(2tJ^^ - w,,) < 0. 12 11 12' 22 12' 
consumers prefer relatively more manufactured goods than at the initial 
income levels. 
Isowelfare lines corresponding to a quadratic form in which the 
parameters satisfy the foregoing assumptions would exhibit the general 
shape represented in Figure 2.1. The maximum occurs at the point denoted 
A. In the initial period, consumers would be consuming one unit of each 
good and the terms of trade (TT) implied by the isowelfare curve at that 
point would be 
Moving along the ray OR would tend to move the TT against the agricul­
tural sector since 0 < 3^/3C^^ < 3^V/3C^^. This suggests if the con­
sumers whose preferences are being represented by this welfare function 
were to be confronted by equiproportionately more of each good, they 
would tend to bid the price of agricultural goods down relative to manu­
factured goods. This is in keeping with Engel's law which states that 
consumers tend to spend a higher proportion of their income on nonfood 
(nonagricultural) items as their level of real income increases. 
The maximum point. A, is assumed to be unattainable within the 
finite horizon. In other words, it is assumed that the economy is at 
such a low level of productive capacity in the initial period that within 
the T planning periods there will not be sufficient expansion in capacity 
forthcoming to produce the quantities of and indicated by (2.4). 
Having discussed the maximand, we now turn to the constraints on 
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Figure 2.1» ïsowelfare curves and implied terms of trade 
The Production Functions 
The production process in each sector is assumed to be defined by 
a Cobb-Douglas form of production function» Output from the subsistence 
sector in period t is given by 
Y = (2.6) 
St s St s£ St s 
Land input, denoted by , is assumed to be fixed throughout the period. 
Labor (L ), purchased inputs (F^), and social overhead capital (SOC) 
are all variable. Purchased inputs include snch items as fertilizers, 
insecticides5 and any other items purchased from the industrial sector. 
^^Since land is fixed throughout the period, notation may be 
simplified by defining a new intercept 
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Labor is measured in terms of man years and as such is "productively" 
employed in the sense that withdrawing labor from this sector would 
reduce output if all other factors remained at their previous levels. 
The SOC variable ic explained in detail below. 
The production process in the commercial agricultural sector differs 
from that in the subsistence sector since capital is used as a factor of 
production. Specifically; 
ht' h "It ''Il 4l K'• <2.7) 
As in the subsistence sector, land is fixed^^ while other factors are 
variable. 
I'le make the following specific assumptions about the production func­
tions in the agricultural sectors: (A) = 1; (B) = 1; (C) = 6^; 
(D) a < g ; (E) A < g.. Assumptions (A) and (B) imply constant returns 
2 2 4 
to scale prevail if all the conventional factors (land, labor, capital 
and manufactured inputs) are varied proportionately. Assumption (C) 
indicates the elasticities of production with respect to manufactured 
inputs are equal between the two sectors, while (D) indicates the 
elasticity of production of labor in the subsistence sector is less than 
52 in the commercial agricultural sector. Assumptions (A) - (D) imply 
that 4- which suggests that the elasticity of production of 
^^A new intercept is defined as 
52 Since labor is combined with capital in the commercial sector, a 
small change in labor input has a larger output response in sector 1 than 
a small change in. labor input in sector s. 
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land in the s sector is greater than the combined elasticity of produc-
53 
tion of capital and land in the commercial sector. Assumption (3) 
implies that, since land is not variable, diminishing marginal produc­
tivity of nonland resources are evident in agricultural production even 
if investment is made in SOC.^^ 
The production process in the manufacturing and capital goods sectors 
is assumed to differ from production in the agricultural sectors since no 
primary or fixed factors are involved and technology improves at a con­
stant exogenous rate of lOOe percent per year. Specifically, the produc­
tion function for manufacturing goods is denoted as 
"it = <1 
and that for capital goods is represented as 
t ^ 1 "S 2_ iS 3 
^3t = °3V3tSf (2-9) 
Thus 5 production in the manufacturing and capital goods sectors is assumed 
to be a function of manufactured inputs, labor, and capital inputs. Both 
of these sectors use their own output in production. 
The next set of constraints to be discussed are the constraints on 
factor availabilities. Before these constraints can be adequately 
explained, it will be necessary to digress briefly and discuss the role 
53 
This is because land is more intensively cultivated in the subsis­
tence sector. 
^^Since G', > 8^, this applies to sector s as well as sector 1„ If 
^ > 3^ or if ^ , this would permit increasing returns to scale which 
would, in effect, lead to problems of nonconvexity. It is for this reason 
that land resources are kept fixed (that is, to maintain convexity). 
Transferring land from one sector to the other would also lead to non­
convexity problems. 
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of the government sector in the decentralized model. In the following 
section the various types of government expenditures are explained. That 
section is followed by a continued discussion of the constraints. 
Government Expenditures and SOC 
In every period, the government collects taxes on all income at a 
constant average and marginal rate, ip. Thus, tax receipts in every period, 
denoted as are proportional to income.Initially; government expendi­
tures are assumed to equal tax receipts in every period. That is, no 
provision is made for foreign aid, deficit financing, or surplus budgets. 
The government has four expenditure alternatives (denoted one 
relating to each sector. Thus we have Z E.^ = M . 
^ It t 
1 
Expenditure in the agricultural sectors is used to accumulate SOC, 
which is accomplished by hiring labor at a fixed wage rate, w. Thus we 
have E^. ^  (1 = 3, 1). This labor engages in various extension 
activities, educational programs, and other activities which have the 
effect of increasing productivity in the agricultural sectors. An 
alternative interpretation would be for this labor to engage in labor 
intensive capital accumulation, such as building a road, dam, or irrigation 
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system using labor as the only significant input. 
55 
The assumption of a constant marginal and average tax rate is not a 
necessary assumption. The tax rate could actually be considered as an 
instrumental variable. 
^^The effect of foreign aid is analyzed with the centralized model in 
Chapter V. 
^^Labor intensive capital accumulation is also assumed by Lewis (33, 
p. 161) in his discussion of capital accumulation by means of monetary 
expansion. 
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Labor employed in these activities is specific to either the commer­
cial or the subsistence agricultural sector. Thus, the government is 
confronted with a choice among investing in none, one, or both of these 
sectors. SOC in these sectors is defined in terms of "accumulated man-
hours". That is 
«St " «si 'V"-' (2.10) 
1=1 
and 
«It ' hi- (2-1» 
1=1 
where (i = s, 1) is an index of the level of SOC available to these 
sectors in the initial period. In essence, (2.10) and (2.11) suggest 
that the level of SOC is cumulative and if an investment in extension 
activities is made in period t, the payoff from this investment is not 
realized until period t ^ 1, but once this investment is made the payoff 
is forthcoming in all subsequent periods. This means that once a new 
technique is learned it is not forgotten, or a dam that is built by 
government labor is infinitely durable (that is, it does not depreciate). 
Two other alternatives of a somewhat different nature are available 
to the government. These alternatives are to invest in capital accumula­
tion in either the manufacturing or the capital goods sector. To invest 
in the manufacturing goods sector, the government must purchase investment 
goods at the market price,^3t' the amount spent on government invest­
ment in sector 2 is = ^ 3t^9t' ^^ese investment goods are combined with 
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Price determination is discussed in a subsequent section. 
the capital stock available during period t in sector 2 and used in 
production in period t v 1= Government expenditure on capital accumula­
tion in the capital goods sector is similar with S„ = ?. ï„ . 
3t 3c 3t 
The essence of these four alternatives is to provide the government 
a choice regarding investment. In the two agricultural sectors, techno­
logical change is a function of government investment in SOC. This 
investment tends to offset the diminishing marginal productivity resulting 
from the fixed amounts of land by acting like an "additional factor". If 
a decision is made to expand agricultural output via public investment, 
the government must decide whether to invest in the commercial sector, 
the subsistence sector, or both. To provide the government with a legiti­
mate choice, however, there muse be an alternative means of utilization 
for government funds which will also contribute to welfare. If the 
government chooses to invest in manufacturing goods, this would tend to 
have both direct and indirect effects on welfare since more manufacturing 
output would become available for consumption (direct effect) and more 
would become available for use as a factor of production in all sectors 
(indirect effect). Investment in the capital goods sector would have its 
payoff only in terms of increased productive capacity in the capital goods 
industry in the subsequent period, and this increased capacity must be 
transferred to either the commercial agricultural or the manufacturing 
goods sector before any payoff in welfare is realized since capital goods 
are not consumed. Thus, if the government invests in capacity expansion 
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Government investment is not the only source of capital accumulation 
in the manufacturing and capital goods sectors. Private capital accumula­
tion is discussed below. 
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in capital goods capacity, there is a lag of two periods before there is 
any payoff, whereas in all other sectors there is a lag of only one 
period. Also, if the government chooses to invest in SOC, there is the 
added payoff of job creation. This payoff is felt during the current 
period. 
This completes the disgression on government expenditures» Tax 
receipts are discussed below. In the next section, factor availabilities 
to the various sectors are discussed. 
Factor Availabilities 
Land 
Land is assumed to be available in fixed amounts to the two agricul­
tural sectors and there is no provision in the model to transfer land 
between the subsistence and commercial sector. The no-transfer provision 
effectively excludes the possibility of "commercializing" the subsistence 
sector by permitting land to be transferred to the commercial sector. 
This is a very restrictive assumption and precludes certain important 
aspects of alternative developmental possibilities. The reason for not 
considering the possibility of transferring land is that this would have 
introduced problems of nonconvexity because agricultural production could 
then realize increasing returns to scale. 
^^The opposite possibility is also excluded but the alternative of 
"decommercializing" agriculture is of much lesser interest. 
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Labor and wage rates 
The total labor supply (L ) is assumed to be perfectly inelastic. 
Labor is mobile among the sectors and all labor is employed. Thus, 
\ 4c St ht St - Sf (2-12) 
The wage rate is assumed to be sticky in a downward direction in all 
sectors except the subsistence sector. In other "wordsj labor receives a 
fixed wage rate,, in all forms of employment except subsistence agricul­
ture.^^ This wage may be rigid in a downward direction because of labor 
unions, unwillingness of laborers to work in these sectors at a lower rate 
of pay, or because of historical precedent. All labor employed in the 
advanced sectors is paid its marginal value productivity in employment. 
Any laborer that cannot find a job in the advanced sectors at this fixed 
wage rate is employed in the subsistence sector. It is assumed that there 
are not enough jobs in the advanced sector to permit all labor to earn the 
wage rate w and consequently there is "surplus labor" in the economy with 
the result that the marginal value productivity of labor in the subsistence 
sector is less than w. This results in a perfectly elastic supply of labor 
to the advanced sector at a fixed real wage rate. This situation prevails 
until so much labor is withdrawn from the subsistence sector that the 
marginal productivity of labor in the subsistence sector increases 
sufficiently to force up the real wage rate in the advanced sectors. 
^^These wage rates are measured in terms of manufactured consumer 
goods. 
^^Subsistence labor income is discussed in detail in a later section. 
Todaro (61) suggests that in many less-developed countries, labor tends to 
migrate to urban centers even though there aren't any jobs available. 
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Manufactured inputs 
The output of the manufacturing sector may be used either for 
consumption or as a factor of production in other sectors- This is 
expressed as 
V =• • ''st ••• St-
Capital stocks 
In the initial period of the program a given stock of capital is 
available in all three advanced sectors. This initial capital stock 
(denoted and may be augmented in subsequent periods through 
investment which involves the purchase of capital goods from the capital 
goods sector. Once capital is placed in a specific sector it is not 
transferrable to other sectors. Capital goods placed in the manufacturing 
goods sector is equally productive in all lines of production in that 
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sector. Finally, capital is assumed to be infinitely durable. 
Since depreciation is being ignored, capital available in period t 
is the sum of the initial capital stock and the investments of all previous 
periods. Since the only source of investment funds in the commercial 
agricultural sector is from private savings, the capital stock in period t 
may be represented as 
1=1 
Two sources of investment funds (public and private savings) are available 
for capital accumulation in the manufacturing and capital goods sectors. 
^^This is not a necessary assumption. 
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Thus, for the manufacturing sector 
K2t - '•hi -'hi)' 
1=1 
and for the capital goods sector 
t-1 
3^1 * % (-31 ^  ^3i)' (2.16) 
i=l 
Since the economy is assumed to be closed, investment goods must be pur­
chased from the capital goods sector which has a limited production 
capacity. This capacity constraint is denoted as 
^3t " ^2t ••• ^3t :2C - Sf 
In addition to this constraint on the supply of capital goods, there is 
also a limited supply of savings which can be utilized to purchases these 
capital goods. This restriction is discussed in the next section along 
with wages and income distribution. 
Income Distribution and Flow 
In this section prices and outputs are assumed to be fixed. The 
government collects taxes at a constant average and marginal rate, , on 
all income earned by land, labor and capital goods. This is equivalent 
to taxing government employees and all output net of payments for manu­
factured inputs. Thus, tax revenue may be denoted as 
\ - * ^ - 6i> + 
The distribution of this revenue among the four government alternatives, 
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is discussed above, while the discussion of the determination of 
the levels of the four uses is deferred until a later section. 
In each of the private sectors, net income after taxes is completely 
distributed among the factors of production. Labor is assumed to consume 
all its income while all the income earned on capital is saved. 
Subsistence sector 
The subsistence sector, like 
model, purchases manufactured inp'/ 
factured inputs are assumed to \ 
employed at a level such that Mi 
^sectors in this 
\ \Since manu-
factors are 
a p Y = P F 
1 It st St St 
The remaining income in this sector ^  
all of its income after paying taxes. Tti; 
subsistence sector is denoted as 
/ (2.19) 
which consumes 
.tTr income in the 
a -<•)(!- = (1 - «Pz-;- ( 2 . 2 0 )  
where ^ and indicate the constant shares of output earned by labor and 
land respectively. Assuming that the income earned by the land is con­
sumed by the peasant operators is equivalent to assuming the peasants own 
the land they are farming and that these subsistence operators do not 
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This is a stronger assumption than Lewis employs. Lewis allows for 
some leakage from income accruing to capital (33, p. 169). Fei and 
Ranis, on the other hand, assume all income on capital is saved and some 
additional savings are forthcoming from the agricultural sector where no 
capital is being used (12, pp. 29-34). Jorgenson (23, p. 326) assumes 
tliat all wages are consumed and all income earned on capital is saved. 
Only Lewis considers public savings. As mentioned above, the constant 
marginal and average tax rate is not a necessarv assumntion^ 
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is discussed above, while the discussion of the determination of 
the levels of the four uses is deferred until a later section. 
In each of the private sectors, net income after taxes is completely 
distributed among the factors of production. Labor is assumed to consume 
all its income while all the income earned on capital is saved. 
Subsistence sector 
The subsistence sector, like all the other private sectors in this 
model, purchases manufactured inputs at the market price. Since manu­
factured inputs are assumed to be perfectly divisible, these factors are 
employed at a level such that MVP equals cost, or 
The remaining income in this sector is attributed to labor which consumes 
all of its income after paying taxes. Thus, net labor income in the 
subsistence sector is denoted as 
(1 - *)(! - = (1 - *)(G2 + (2-20) 
where and a indicate the constant shares of output earned by labor and 
land respectively. Assuming that the income earned by the land is con­
sumed by the peasant operators is equivalent to assuming the peasants own 
the land they are farming and that these subsistence operators do not 
This is a stronger assumption than lewis employs. Lewis allows for 
some leakage from income accruing to capital (33, p. 169). Fei and 
Ranis, on the other hand, assume all income on capital is saved and some 
additional savings are forthcoming from the agricultural sector where no 
capital is being used (12, pp. 29-34). Jorgenson (23, p. 326) assumes 
that all wages are consumed and all income earned on capital is saved. 
Only Lewis considers public savings. As mentioned above, the constant 
marginal and average tax rate is not a necessary assumption. 
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save. An alternative interpretation is that the landlord fails to 
collect any rent. 
By assumption we have 
(°2 + «4) " \t' (2.21) 
and it is this assumption along with the assumption of labor mobility 
which results in a perfectly elastic labor supply to the advanced sectors. 
Commercial agriculture 
Production in sector 1 differs from that in sector s inasmuch as 
capital is used as a factor of production. This capital stock earns its 
marginal value productivity in every period as do all the other factors of 
production. Labor must be hired at a constant wage rate w and manufactured 
inputs must be purchased. Land in the commercial sector is assumed to be 
owned by the capitalists, or, alternatively, the capital may be assumed to 
be owned by the landlords.This leads to the income distribution 
relations for manufactured inputs 
- Wit' (2-22) 
labor 
2flC?lC = \t (2-23) 
and capitalists (or landlords) 
(«3 "^'it^ lt = "it^ t • klL*l' (2-24) 
^The term capitalist is used as an abbreviation for "owner of 
capital stock". The term capitalist does not necessarily imply private 
ownership in the sense that individuals must own the capital. However, 
private ownership is perhaps the most meaningful interpretation for the 
decentralized model. 
44 
where and b_, denote the rate of return on capital and land 
It It ^ 
respectively. 
Manufacturing and capital goods sectors 
Income distribution in the manufacturing goods sector is similar to 
that in capital goods sector with only the coefficients differing. Since 
manufactured goods are used as an input in the production of manufactured 
goods, we have the requirements that the MPP equals one, or 
For labor we have 
( 2 - 2 6 )  
and the capital owners receive the income earned on capital, which is 
denoted as 
^3^2t^2t " (2.27) 
where represents the MVP of capital. 




'2'3c*3t - "Sf (2.29) 
The income accruing to the capital owners is 
" St'Sf (2-™) 
where is the MVP of capital. 
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Labor income and consumption restraints 
It is assumed that all the income earned by labor is entirely spent 
on consumption of agricultural and manufactured goods. The only savings 
from this income source is via government savings out of the taxes 
collected from labor. Since the capitalists save all their income, the 
aggregate consumers budget restraint may be represented as 
••• Vit =  »  - « « 2  
In addition to this budget constraint, it is required that consumption in 
any period of the plan not fall below the level attained in preplan 
period, which may be expressed as 
a 1 (2.32) 
and 
Cgt > 1. (2.33) 
A final constraint on consumption is the requirement that the consumption 
of agricultural goods not exceed production., 
Clt = 7st + ?lt- (2-34) 
This completes the discussion of the determination and disposition of 
labor income. The income earned by the capitalists is used to accumulate 
more capital. The allocation of these funds among the alternatives is 
somewhat more complicated and is discussed in the following section. 
similar constraint applies to the consumption of manufactured 
;cods and is given as (2.13). 
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Private investment 
The determination of investment behavior has been a topic of much 
discussion and controversy in economics. Since it is not the purpose 
of this investigation to enter into this controversy, a set of simplifying 
assumptions are used to specify the investment decisions of the 
capitalists. 
In every period, the capitalists receive a return or rent from the 
use of their capital stock in production. This rent is used to accumulate 
more capital by the purchase of investment goods from the capital goods 
industry. This leads to an overall budget constraint of the form 
Equation (2.35) requires the value of private savings to equal the value 
of private investment. 
Any investment goods purchased in period t cannot be used in produc­
tion until period t 4- 1. It is assumed that the capitalists allocate 
investment goods among the three sectors in such a manner such that they 
maximize the expected return they will receive from their capital stocks 
in period t -I- 1. It is further assumed that the capitalists expect all 
prices and factor allocations in the subsequent periods to remain 
unchanged. However, these private investors take full account of govern­
ment investment in either SOC in the agricultural sectors or in 
"private" capital in the manufacturing or capital goods sectors. In 
addition, the investors take into account the exogenous technical change 
which occurs in the manufacturing and capital goods sectors. 
(2.35) 
Symbolically, the capitalists attempt to maximize expected or 
anticipated revenue 
R = (S^ h/' 
••• ht • h/' Vst» 
(•St ^3t ••• V(2-36) 
where T = t ^  1. 
This must be maximized subject to the budget constraint (2.35) and the 
requirement that investment in any sector must be nonnegative (that is ; 
disinvestment is not allowed). Formulating this as a constrained maximum 
problem by introducing an undetermined Lagrangean multiplier, Z, and 
applying the Kuhn-Tucker conditions (27), the following first order 
conditions result: 
ii = Alt(Kit + lit) ^  : 0; 
It 
T — = p. T ^ n- (0 'xi\ 
-"It 81 ' ^ It -
3R - ^3-1 
"2t 
l2t '2' - (2-3*) 
= ^ t('S-c 3^t - Zp3t : 
^3t St : "• (2-39) 
where 
*lt "^3(«3''-\)''lt<T°l''X'' (2.40) 
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and 
St = (2-42) 
Conditions (2.37) - (2.39) along with the budget constraint (2.35) 
will, at least in principle, define values of and that will 
maximize expected revenue for the capitalists„ If we make the additional, 
highly-restrictive assumption that and are positive in all 
periods, these first order conditions simplify considerably to the 
following two equations: 
^Bt'^'St ^3t ^3t^ ~2t ^2t^ (2.43) 
and 
^2t h/''' 
Equations (2.43) and (2.44), along with the budget constraint (2.35) will 
define optimum levels of investment in each of the three sectors. 
At this point it is necessary to digress briefly to elaborate on the 
implications of the assumption that is positive in all sectors. 
Equations (2.43) and (2.44) suggest the capitalists allocate their invest­
ment funds in such a manner that the capitalist's share of the marginal 
value of additional expected revenue is equal in all three sectors. In 
effect this means that in each period the capitalists have sufficient 
investment funds to attain an equilibrium. The much less restrictive 
investment criteria elaborated in conditions (2.37) - (2.39) indicate 
that the capitalists invest in the most profitable industry until either 
the investment funds are used UD or until the capitalistes share of the 
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expected marginal value of investment arising from the expanded capital 
falls to the level of the second most rewarding investment opportunity. 
If the latter alternative occurs and additional funds are available, 
simultaneous investment is carried on in the two most profitable industries 
until all the investment funds are used up or until the levels of return 
on capital in the two most profitable lines of investment are reduced to 
the rate of return expected in the third industry. Then simultaneous 
investment is carried on in all three industries until all the investment 
funds have been allocated. It is only if there are sufficient investment 
funds available to attain this state of expected equality among the rates 
of return in all sectors that the assumption of simultaneous investment in 
all three sectors is not restrictive. In essence, the assumption of 
simultaneous expansion in all sectors implies that sufficient investment 
funds are available so that the economy can afford the luxury of balanced 
.X 67 growth. 
The implications of this assumption are discussed in greater derail 
in Chapter IV, where the "balanced investment" assumption is relaxed. 
Assuming balanced investment in all sectors is merely a simplifying 
assumption and is not to be construed as advocating balanced growth. 
Wage, Price and Output Determination 
The purpose of this section is to discuss the operation of the model 
without the influence of the government. At the start of every period 
^^For a critique of the balanced growth thesis and reasons why this 
cannot be attained, see Hirschman (18, Ch. 4). Hirschman argues that 
unbalanced growth may be desirable. 
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capital stocks K = (K^, IC^) are taken as data. Mow the question is 
how do the consumers3 capitalists, laborers, and entrepreneurs interact 
within that period to determine wages, prices and outputs? A sinrplified 
model is introduced to demonstrate that there are two degrees of freedom 
in the absence of government » These two degrees of freedom are subse­
quently used to choose a numeraire for prices and to define the exogenous 
wage rate. 
Consider the following simplified model, where the suffix "a"' on an 
equation number indicates the equation is derived from or is analogous to 
the original equation. Time subscripts are omitted since it is necessary 
to consider only one period. In each period consumers (laborers) attempt 
to maximize aggregate welfare 
W = W(C^, C,), (2.1a) 
subject to their budget (income) restraint 
P.C. + P2C = J(P,Y), (2.313) 
where P and Y are vectors representing (P^, P^, ?^) and (Y , Y , Y^j Y ) 
respectively. It is well known from consumer demand theory that such a 
maximization leads to a system of demand equations which are homogeneous 
of degree zero in prices and incomes» Since in this particular model 
nominal consumer income (2.31) is homogeneous of degree zero in prices, 
the resulting demand equations are homogeneous of degree zero in prices. 
Consequently, the demand equations are sufficient to determine only 
relative prices. The two demand equations are denoted as 
^^Assuming government taxes and employment are ignored. 
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= C-(P,Y) (2.45) 
and 
Cg = (2.46) 
Next, consider production in the commercial agricultural sector. The 
production function, 
L^, K^) (2.7a) 
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and the first order conditions, 
= P, (2.22a) 
and 
,1 ? = w, (2.23a) 
imply a short run supply equation 
P^, w, K^). (2.47) 
Similarly for the manufacturing sector, from 
Yg = «^(Fg, Lg, Kz)' (2.8a) 
^2^ = j?2' (2.25a) 
and 
= L), (2.26a) 
we get the supply equation 
2^ = T^ (22' Kg)- (2.48) 
The analogous equations relating to the capital goods sector, 
Yg = «^(Fg, L], Kg), (2.9a) 
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The subscripts on the functions denote partial derivatives. 
P g H p  =  Z g '  ( 2 . 2 8 a )  
and 
P _ H ?  =  w  ( 2 . 2 9 a )  
3 -3 
imply the supply equation 
Y ]  =  Y ^ C P ^ ,  P g ,  w ,  K ^ ) .  ( 2 . 4 9 )  
Since employment in the subsistence sector is a residual there is no 
derived demand for labor for this sector. Consequently^ the supply 
equation for the subsistence sector is of a somewhat different nature. 
From (2.22a) and (2.23a) for sector 1 we get an equation indicating the 
derived demand for labor in sector 1. This is denoted as 
= L^(Pi, Pg, w, Ki). (2.50) 
Similarly, for sectors 2 and 3 we get derived labor demand equations 
denoted as 
L g  =  w ,  K ^ )  ( 2 . 5 1 )  
and 
L g  =  L  ( P g ,  P g ,  w .  K g ) .  ( 2 . 5 2 )  
Substituting ( 2 . 5 0 )  -  ( 2 . 5 2 )  into ( 2 . 1 2 a ), we get employment in the 
subsistence sector as 
L = L  -  =  L ® ( P ,  w ,  K ,  L  ) .  ( 2 . 5 3 )  
so ' ' o 
From (2.53), the production function 
Y  =  H G ( F  ,  L g ) ,  ( 2 . 6 a )  
and the first order condition 
P . a f  =  ( 2 . 1 9 a )  
53 
we get the supply equation for the subsistence sector.^ 
Y = YG(P,w, K, L^). (2.54) 
From the first order conditions (2.19a); (2.22a); (2.23a); (2.25a); 
(2.26a), (2.28a), and (2.29a), we can obtain derived demand equations for 
manufactured inputs 
F = F^(P, K, L^), (2.55) 
= F^CE^, Pg, W; K^), (2.56) 
Fg = F2(P2, w, K^), (2.57) 
ana 
F] = F3(P2, P], w. Kg). (2.58) 
By a similar procedure, it is possible to obtain derived demand equations 
for investment goods from the first order conditions (2.43) and (2.44), 
and the capitalists' budget constraint (2.35a). These investment demand 
equations are denoted as 
= I^CP, w, K), (2.59) 
= I^(P, w, K), (2.60) 
and 
I = l3(P, w, K). (2.61) 
By making the appropriate substitutions, the following market 
equilibrium equations are obtained for agricultural goods 




w. Kg) = F^(2, w, K, Pg' w, K,) + F^X^z' K^] 
+ F^CPg, Pj, w, Kj) * c2(p, w, K, L^), (2.13a) 
investment goods 
Y^(P2, Pj, w, K) = I^(P, w, K) + i2(p, w, K) + i3(p,, w, K), (2.17a) 
and labor 
s,_ . ,1,_ _ _ , . _2. 
L Q = L (P, w, K) + L (P^, Pg, w, K^) + L (Pg, w, Kg) 
+ L^(P^, P^, w. Kg) (2.12a) 
are obtained. 
This leaves four equations to determine four variables, P 
and w. However, it must be recalled that in order to determine L in 
p p 
1' -2' -3 
(2.53), the values for L^, L^s and were substituted into (2.12a). 
Thus5 (2.12a) cannot be used as an equilibrium condition to determine a 
wage rate. (In effect a fifth variable, remains to be determined if 
(2.12a) is used as an equilibrium condition.) This leaves three equations 
and four unknowns. By choosing a numeraire and identifying an exogenous 
wage rate, the system becomes determinate. Thus, two equations are added: 
Pgt = 1, (2-62) 
and 
w = w„ (2.63) 
In other words, manufactured output is chosen as the numeraire and labor 
is paid an exogenously determined constant amount, w, of manufactured 
goods per period. (These manufactured goods can, of course, be bartered 
or traded for agricultural goods.) 
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Supply response in agriculture - a digression 
Much has been written about the nature of supply response in 
subsistence agriculture.^^ In this section it is demonstrated that in 
the decentralized model used in this study, subsistence output might 
respond inversely to an increase in the price of agricultural output. 
However, this potential inverse response is more than offset by an 
increase in production by the commercial agricultural sector. In other 
words ; aggregate supply responds positively to changes in price in the 
decentralized model. 
One possibility for studying the supply response of agricultural 
output would be to differentiate the supply side of the equilibrium 
condition in (2.34a) with respect to This would presume explicit 
solutions for the supply functions of both the subsistence and commercial 
agricultural sectors. An indirect and much simpler means of examining 
supply response is to make the appropriate substitutions into the two 
equations 
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9Y ap 31 
a! HÎ (2.64) 
and 
(2.65) 
^^See, for example, the literature cited by Bhagwati and Chakravarty 
(4). 
^^The same result applies to the centralized model introduced in 
Chapter IV. 
7 2 
In the derivation of (2.65) it has been assumed that 





From (2,6) we obtain 
a Y 




H f  =  ( 2 . 6 7 )  
S s 
From (2.19) we get 
îV 
3F a.(P.c.o L ^) 
®i ^ 
and ( 2 . 5 3 )  together with (2.23) yields 
fh h t 
'Pi " " ®i " 
(2 .68)  
( 2 . 6 9 )  
* A * A ,,63 1 j ^  1 
where = G^o^, 0^ = and b, = 
Substituting into ( 2 . 6 4 )  yields 
^ ^ J-
This will be negative if the absolute value of the second term on the 
right exceeds the magnitude of the first. In other words, output from 
the subsistence sector will decline as the product price increases if 
the effect on production resulting from the exodus of labor from the 
subsistence sector (due to the more lucrative jobs being created in the 
commercial sector) more than offsets the production increase resulting 
from the increased use of manufactured inputs. This possibility does not 
exist for total supply, however, as is clearly evident by adding ( 2 . 7 0 )  
to the analogous equation for the commercial sector. This result is 
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9 Y 3 Y ^ Y a fD m G V h /O n ^2\ 1 
__S 1 _ _1 
9 P^ "'" 3 P^ p. 
> . 6iïibi(6iP.OiL»2) 
The first and second terms to the right of the equal sign are clearly 
positive. That the last term is also positive becomes evident when the 
assumption implied in (2.21) is recalled. Specifically^ the marginal 
productivity of labor in the subsistence sector is lower than in the 
commercial sector. 
Finite Planning Horizons and Post-Plan Considerations 
When only a finite horizon is considered in any intertemporal develop-
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ment plan, several interrelated problems arise. Two of the problems 
involve the length of the planning period to be considered and the 
allowances that are to be made during the plan for periods following 
the plan. 
The choice of length of the planning horizon is crucial in an 
optimizing model. An economic plan that is optimal for t periods may 
not be optimal for T 1 periods. An ideal model would be one in which 
the optimal plan for the first periods would be invariant regardless of 
whether a horizon of T periods or T t (trO) periods is being considered. 
One theoretical solution to this problem would be to consider a horizon 
encompassing the infinite future. From a practical standpoint, however, 
uncertainty regarding the future, lack of relevant data, and computational 
7 3 
For a discussion of some of these problems see Chakravarty and 
Eckaus ( 7 ) .  
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difficulties invariably result in finite horizons in empirical applica-
74 
tions. 
Once the decision has been made to truncate the horizon at T periods, 
the question arises as to what happens during the periods immediately 
following the termination of the plan. Post-plan activities and 
possibilities are conditioned by the productive capacity bequeathed to 
the post-plan era. If no special provision is made to provide some 
incentive to invest or accumulate productive capacity in the latter 
stages of the plan, the myopia of the decision makers would tend to 
emphasize current consumption rather than to accumulate for future 
generations. One possible solution is to require a specified capital 
stock to be available for period T 4 1. Another possibility is to 
provide an additional incentive to accumulate near the end of the plan 
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by attaching a value to any capital bequeathed to posterity. 
In the present model, the incentives to the private investors in 
period t are a function of prices, returns to capital, and government 
investments in period t. The same considerations apply in period %. 
The investors are assumed to behave in the same manner in the last period 
of the plan as in any other period since they are not "aware" that period 
T is the last period of the plan.^^ However, the rules specifying 
^^For a discussion of some of the difficulties involved with con­
sidering infinite planning horizons, see Chakravarty (6). 
^^The decision of what and how much to leave for future generations 
is essentially a political decision and involves ethics. The role of 
economics in this decision is to identify the consequences of the 
alternatives. 
^^This appears to be an assumption that has empirical relevance if 
the transitions between plans are reasonably smooth. 
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government expenditures provide no incentive to invest in private capital 
accumulation or SOC in the final period since this investment does not 
contribute directly to welfare in period T. The only payoff realized in 
the plan period is through any additional employment created in the 
capital goods industry or government employment in the placement of SOC. 
However, the government collects tax revenue which must be spent. The rule 
imposed on government expenditures in period is that expenditures in the 
final period must be allocated in the same proportions as in period T _ 1, 
Defining T = t - 1, these rules may be specified as 
"r^sT = (2.72) 
( 2 . 7 3 )  
~ ^ t^3T^2T (2o74) 
and 
V3T^3T ~ ^  ^3T^3T (2.75) 
This completes the formal presentation of the model. In the 
following section an overview of the model is presented. The model is 
optimized in Chapter III. 
An Overview of the Decentralized Model 
This section is expository. An attempt is made to provide some 
insight into the interrelationships among the various sectors of the 
economy represented by the model discussed in this chapter. 
A diagramatic presentation of the expenditure and income flows is 
presented in Figure 2.2. The five sectors are represented as rectangles 
and the two ovals represent the two groups of income recipients, the 
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Figure 2.2. Income and expenditure flows 
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capital owners and the laborers. Landowners are not included as a 
separate class of income recipients. The rent earned on land is simply 
attributed to the laborers in the subsistence sector and to the capitalists 
in the commercial agricultural sector. The flows above the diagonal line 
AA' represent expenditures and those below the line represent income 
receipts. Expenditure flows are discussed first. 
The laborers spend all their income on consumption goods. This 
consumption expenditure is divided between agricultural goods (P^C^) and 
manufactured goods (PC). The expenditures on agricultural goods are 
divided between the commercial and the subsistence agricultural sectors. 
Consumption expenditures by labor are the only source of revenue for the 
agricultural sectors. The manufacturing goods sector, on the other hand, 
sells its products to the two agricultural sectors and the capital goods 
sector as well as to consumers. Hence the manufacturing goods sector 
receives revenue from all four of these sources. 
The capital goods sector sells its output to either the capitalists 
or to the government. The capitalists spend all their income on private 
investment goods. The government has two classes of expenditure alterna­
tives. The tax revenue which the government collects may be spent on 
either SOC for the agricultural sectors or on investment goods for the 
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capital and manufacturing goods sectors. 
Turning now to the income flows, labor receives income from all five 
sectors. However, since capital is not used in the subsistence or the 
77 
Actually the government expenditure on SOC is both an expenditure 
and an income receipt since the entire expenditure net of taxes accrues 
directly to labor. 
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government sectors, the capital owners do not receive income from these 
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two sectors. Net revenue in the subsistence agricultural sector accrues 
to labor. Part of this net income is rent on the land which the laborers 
are presumed to own. The net revenue in the commercial agricultural 
sector is divided between the capitalists (who own the land in this 
sector) and the laborers. Since no primary factors are employed in the 
manufacturing and capital goods sectors, the net revenue in these sectors 
is divided between the laborers and capitalists as wages and return on 
capital stocks. 
Net revenue in this section is defined as total revenue less the 
cost of purchased manufactured inputs and taxes. 
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CHAPTER III. OPTIMIZATION OF THE DECENTRALIZED MODEL 
The general nature of the optimizing problem for the decentralized, 
dual-economy model discussed in Chapter II is to maximize a differentiablep 
concave function (2.1) subject to a number of differentiable convex con­
straints. In addition, it is required that all variables must be non-
negative. This type of problem can be maximized by application of the 
Kuhn-Tucker first-order conditions (27). This involves formulating a 
Lagrangean function which is presented in the next section. The first-
order conditions for the decentralized model are presented in the sub­
sequent section. The chapter is concluded with a discussion of some of 
the implications of the optimum solution. 
The Lagrangean Function 
The Lagrangean multipliers are denoted as Z^^, where the subscript i 
corresponds to the equation number of the associated constraint in Chapter 
II. The subscript t refers to the time period. The constraints in the 
function are formulated in a manner such that the associated dual variables 
(Lagrangean multipliers) are all positive with the possible exceptions of 
Z^3^3 ^44t' ^72' ^ 73' ^ 74' ^75 can be either positive or 
negative. Some of the equations in Chapter II have been eliminated by 
substitution. Letting T = ? _ i, the following Lagrangean function 
results : 
V  =  -  " z z C z t i t '  ' : '  » > " '  
- ' "6c(°s4<t\: - \t> • ' - ?!() 
-•• ' :sc(°2(^ ':")'4t4^ 2t - ?2c) 
•:•  ^St<"3<l-'">'''3^ 3t's't - '3t' 
•" ^ ^ 12tK 'ht "'-It " \c "'-U 'ht 'ht^ 
' ^13t«2t -"st -"it -f2c - "3^ -St' 
"'• ^ ^ 17c®3t -~lt -"2t '^3t -^2e - ^3t' 
- "(i-« (V.-'• ht) - V.'V. •'• St" 
' ^19t<''st-"l'^ u\t> ':'  ^22t(ht-Vlt^ t> 
' ^23£<Vl£^lt-ht"> - ' S5t(^2t-V2t> 
•'•  ^ '26c^ 2^^ 2t-'°''2t' "'•  ^^ 23t'^ 3t-''l^ 3t*3t' 
^ ^ S9t<y3t^3t-"»-3t> 
+  I  Z31t' ( l - « [ < « 2 n>'^ stflt-^ Vlt''l->V2t'V3t"3t 
•• "<^t'''^it'l -C,^} 
•=• ^ ^ 32E®lt-" + Z 
It It 2t 
33t^"2t 
+ z Z,u (ILJ-Lj-IoJ } 43t 2t^"2£ 2t 2t' 
'44c ^ 2^t^ "'2t'"'^ 2t''-2t' 
-:- Z Z,, . {A^  ^(IC , -:-ïo.'!-ïo )  ^(K, ../S'l,,.) } 
3t^ 3t 3t 3t' 
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' '72 V, - hA> 
E 
+ z - f^T"2T^r/ 
+ Z Zys^^gT-gT^T " 
In subsequent sections ( 2 . 1 0 ) ,  ( 2 . 1 1 ) ,  ( 2 . 1 4 ) - ( 2 . 1 6 ) ,  (2.18) and 
(2.40)-(2.42) are treated as though they have been eliminated by substitu­
tion. However, the symbols defined by these equations are used whenever 
this simplifies notation. In addition, (2.62) and (2.63) are completely 
eliminated by substitution. All the summations in (3.1) refer to the 
subscript t and run over the range t=l; .,., T. 
The First-Order Conditions 
In this section, the first-order conditions for an optimum resulting 
from the application of the Kuhn-Tucker conditions to the Lagrangean 
function (3.1) are presented. These conditions specialize to the classical 
calculus first-order conditions if the variable in question is known to be 
positive. The economy represented by the model has four production 
sectors with Cobb-Douglas production functions. Assuming that production 
is positive in all sectors implies that all of the factor inputs in every 
period are positive. In Chapter II the simplifying assumptions were made 
that I.^ > 0 for all i and t. Constraints (2.32) and (2.33) require C^^ 
and C^j. to be positive and it is not unreasonable to assume and P^^ 
7 9  
to be positive. This leaves only the four government expenditure 
79 If this were not the case, there would be no incentive to produce. 
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variables to be subjected to the corner conditions. More specifically, 
the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are applied to the four variables 
he 
A word about notation. Subscripts on V denote partial derivatives 
By ( e . g . ,  = ^ ) • For simplicity, time subscripts are omitted whenever 
this will not cause any confusion. In all cases the same first-order 
conditions apply to every time period (t=l; T) unless otherwise 
specified. The first-order conditions for an optimum are as follows: 
- hlh-h2-^3i ' " 0.2) 
'c, - " ^13-Sr^33 = » 
"Y ' - hs-l"! 
S 
+ = 0 (t = 1, ..., T-2) (3.4) 
-=^22^^ + ^23^1®2 ••• 
-1- Z Pj(l-ï)(BjvB^ ) = 0 (t-1, ..., T-2) (3.5) 
= -Zg^-ZjjvZ^gni-Yi) - Z^^II Z^^Y, V 
+ Zj5(l-f)Yj = 0 (t=l, ..., T-2) (3.6) 
^Ï3 - - W3'l + 
+ ° ° (t=I, ..., T-2) (3.7) 
"F ' h'-lVs - hs •' '19 ' " <3-3) 
S 
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Vi'-l'h - - '/?! = 0 <3-5) 
S'lh'h - hi'^ u - =  °  » • " '  
Z . a  Y  / L  -  Z . _  =  0  ( 3 . 1 2 )  
6 2s s Iz 
- ^2-^23" - ' ° (3-13) 
- h2-V- «43'-V)''2^ »2-'-Î2"2)"" = " 
Z,'2^ 3/^ 3 - 2^-^ 29" - " " (3.15) 
(l-«p+Yj(l-B^)) - Zi,°i?.-Z22B,Yi+Z2,e2?i 
+Z2^ [(l-Y){(a2:a^ )Yg+B2Yl}-Ci] + Z22(1-V)(62+B^ )Y 1 
- Z,,A.(K.+I.)B3"1/P_ = 0 (t=l, ..., T-2) (3.16) 
44 1 1 1 1 
Zjg(ni-«j)Ï3 - ï^-îj) -I- (Z;,»; - -:' Zsi'zCi-v))?; 
.. - h-12-^3' - V3(^3^-^3+"3)''''/'3 = " 
(t=l. ...3 T-2) (3.17) 
3^ . (^ 7i^ li/^ li) " ^ 17t " ^ 35t-3t i=t-:-i 
T 83-2 
'I- (1-S ^) 2 Z . . A (K .v-L, .) =0 ^,3.18) 
3 . 441 li li Ix i=t 
3^ . " ^ 7^t"^ 35t^ 3t i=t-!-l 
••• C3-I)/ (^43r"44i)^2i('=2i'-i2r^2i)"'' = " (3-"> 
l = t 
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Jt 1—tvi 
-:. (1-6) Z Z._.A_(I(..rî_.4.I_.)^3-2^Q (3 20) 
3 . , 4ji j>i 3i 3i Ji i=t 
"l = \ + "(1-?)(Z31-Zis) i 0; 
St l=Lvl 
L ^V- = 0; L > 0 (t=l, ..., T-2) (3.21) 
^ "'st 
= \ - hit •• ('31 -
It i=t-M 
33-1 
t = i 




-KÏ3-1) ^  - »• 
i=t 
Î V, = 0; i > 0 (t=l, ..., T-2) (3.23) 
zt 
- S , -hlt-hstht 3c i=t-!-l 
•• (i-'s) / ^43AiOSÂrSi>'''' : 
1=L 
Ï V- = 0; Ï > 0; (t=l, .T-2) (3.24) 
^3t 
In addition to the abo e first-order conditions, certain special 
first-order conditions are required to determine the values of some of 
the variables in the last two periods of the plan. These special first-
order conditions result from the restrictions placed on the allocation of 
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government investment during periods T-1 and T. These special conditions 
can be derived in a straightforward manner by simply differentiating 
(3.1) with respect to the appropriate variables for periods t-1 and 
and then applying the rules of calculus or Kuhn and Tucker, Although the 
derivation is relatively simple, the resulting equations and inequalities 
are very cumbersome and difficult to interpret. Since these conditions 
are not crucial to the subsequent discussion they are not presented. 
The first-order conditions in (3„2)-(3.24) and the special conditions 
relating to the last two periods of the plan must be combined with the 
equations of the model to determine values for the variables that will 
optimize (2.1). The relevant equations from Chapter II are (2.6)-(2.9), 
(2.12), (2.13), (2.17)-(2.19), (2.22), (2.23), (2.25), (2.26), (2.28), 
(2.29), (2.31)-(2.35), (2.43), (2.44) and (2.72)-(2.75). It should be 
noted that the failure to present all of the first-order conditions 
relating to the last two periods of the plan results in a certain amount 
of indeterminacy in the earlier periods of the plan as well. The sub­
sequent discussion is not affected by this indeterminacy. It is 
sufficient that the entire system is determinate. 
In the next section, factors influencing the feasibility and 
desirability of investing in SOC in the subsistence sector in one period 
are discussed. This is followed by a section discussing the remaining 
investment alternatives available to the government. These alternatives 
are compared with private investment opportunities. 
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Investing in SOC in the Subsistence Sector 
In every time period the government has a certain amount of tax 
revenue to allocate among the four alternatives L _, , I and = 
s t J-t ^ L j L. 
The optimum levels of these variables must satisfy conditions (3.21)-
(3.24) in each of the first t-2 periods. Thus, the government should 
invest in SOC in the subsistence sector in period t only if Vr =0 in 
'*^ st 
( 3 . 2 1 ) .  This implies that 
\ = hit ••• <3.25; 
l = t--l 
where the two terms on the left are social payoffs while those on the 
right are social opportunity costs. An interpretation of (3.25) is that 
if is to be greater than zero, then the sum of the discounted marginal 
social value productivity in all subsequent plan periods of labor used in 
subsistence SOC accumulation in period t plus the social value of income 
paid to labor on the SOC project must be large enough to offset the social 
opportunity cost of the labor employed on the project plus the social 
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opportunity cost of the government expenditure. Thus, the problem is 
to identify those particular characteristics of an economy that will 
contribute to fulfilling this requirement. From (3.25) a number of factors 
can be identified. 
The condition which must be satisfied to make it socially desirable 
to invest in subsistence SOC in period t depends on the amount that will 
be invested in subsistence SOC in period T-1. It is this type of inter­
temporal or dynamic link which results in the indeterminacy in the earlier 
periods from not specifying all the first-order conditions for the last two 
periods of the plan. Thus, a certain amount of intertemporal substitution 
is possible. The higher the level of L ^ the relatively less 
s, - i 
desirable it will be to invest in subsistence sector SOC in period t<^-l. 
Similarly, the larger the relatively less desirable it will be to 
invest in subsistence SOC in period 
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The first factor to be discussed is the coefficient, ^  , Ceteris 
paribus, the larger the magnitude of ^the more productive SOC will be 
at all levels of G , and consequently, the higher the optimum G /Y 
St ' ^ ° ^ st st 
ratio will be for any given set of social valuations of costs and payoffs. 
What particular characteristics of an economy make the subsistence sector 
responsive to investments in SOC? Schultz suggests one of the crucial 
elements is the level of education of the people involved (57). 
Unquestionably, many other social and physical characteristics of the 
people and the type and nature of the agriculture involved have important 
influences on this coefficient. The magnitude of ^ will also depend on 
the type of infrastructure being developed (for example, building irriga­
tion systems versus extension activities). 
A higher ^ coefficient will make investment in SOC physically more 
productive and, ceteris paribus, more socially profitable. Similarly, 
the higher the social valuation of subsistence agricultural production 
(Z,^) in subsequent periods, the higher the likelihood that the benefits 
accruing to investment in SOC in period t will offset the costs involved. 
The value of this variable, may be expected to vary inversely with 
the ratio of In other words, as the ratio agricultural produc­
tion to manufacturing "surplus" increases, the social valuation of agri­
cultural production might be expected to fall.^^ Hence, the higher the 
ratio of C^/C^, the relatively less desirable investment in G^^ becomes. 
This is what happens to the terms of trade between those two goods. 
See the discussion in Chapter II. 
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The social value of an additional marginal unit of labor (consumer) 
income in period t is given by Z_ The value of this variable varies 
directly with the proportion of the population employed in the subsistence 
sector. That is, the value of increases as the proportion of the 
entire labor force employed in the subsistence sector (L /L ) increases= 
^ St o 
This is because, for a given set of prices, per capita real income to 
labor declines as the ratio L /L increases, and ceteris paribus the 
st o 
marginal social value of an additional unit of consumer income (Z 
will increase as income decreases. Thus, ceteris paribus, the higher the 
proportion of labor in subsistence agriculture, the relatively more 
desirable it becomes to invest in G 
st 
Turning to the right hand side of (3.25), the marginal social 
opportunity cost of an additional unit of labor (Z^^^) may be expected to 
decline as the size of the labor force (L^) increases. This follows 
because the value of Z^^ is determined to a large extent by the social 
value productivity of labor in subsistence agriculture and this value 
declines as L and L increase. 
o s 
The last term on the right hand side of the equation indicates the 
social opportunity cost of using government tax revenue to accumulate SOC. 
The magnitude of this term is related to the amount of tax revenue 
available and the other alternatives open to the government. ™hese 
alternatives are discussed in the next section. 
In conclusion, it may be asserted that for an economy with a given 
configuration of wages, prices, capital stocks, SOC, primary resource 
base, and technology, the social desirability of investing in SOC in the 
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subsistence sector will increase as the size of the labor force (L^) 
increases. This follows because for a given wage-price-capital stock 
8? 
configuration, L /L increases as L increases since L is a residual 
* St o 0 st 
which varies directly with L „ As L increases, Y increases and the 
o st st 
"optimum" level of G increases. In addition, the influence of an 
^ st 
expanded labor supply on the social desirability of subsistence SOC 
expansion through the influence of the increased ratio the 
increased social payoff to employment creation and the reduced 
social opportunity cost of labor have already been enumerated. 
Alternative Investment Opportunities 
In the preceding section it was suggested that the social opportunity 
cost of using government tax revenue to accumulate SOC in the subsistence 
sector depended on the amount of tax revenue available as well as the 
social desirability of investment alternatives. The alternatives 
available to the government in any period are expenditures on 2t' 
and ï^t' any of these investment alternatives are to be utilized in 
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a particular period, the corresponding first-derivative of (3.1) must be 
equal to zero in the first-order conditions (3.22)-(3.24). For example, 
if Ï > 0, then V- = 0 in (3.24). Suppose V= = 0. Subtracting V-
Igt ^3t 3t 




Note that at least one of the four government alternatives must be 
utilized in every period. 
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' S5t'3t - ^ 8t^ 3t = » (3.26) 
and since P is positive by assumption^ 
=^35t = Zl6t- (3.26a) 
This suggests that if it is socially desirable for the government to 
invest in ï , then the social opportunity cost of using government tax 
revenue (Z g^) for this purpose must be equal to the social opportunity 
cost of using private investment funds (Z ^). Furthermore, if (3.25a) 
holds, then it follows immediately from (3.19) and (3.23) that 
V_ — V- = 0 (3.27) 
^2t 2t 
In other words, if it is socially desirable for government to invest in 
at the margin, then it is also socially desirable for the government 
to invest in at the margin. This result is not surprising in view of 
the balanced investment assumption discussed in Chapter II. If the 
additional opportunity of investing in private capital in sector 1 was 
available to the government^ the same result would apply. If it was 
socially desirable for the government to invest in either of the other 
two sectors, then it would also be desirable to invest in I^^ at the 
margin. 
If the assumption that Vr = 0 is relaxed but the requirement that 
-^ St 
V- < 0 is retained, then it is immediately obvious from (3.26) that 
3t ~ 
Zl8t ; Ssf (3-2Gb) 
This suggests that the social benefit to be derived from an additional 
unit of tax revenue must always be at least as great as the social 
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benefit to be derived from an additional unit of private savings. This 
result follows because of the unilateral transfer possibilities from the 
public budget to the private savings fund. If the marginal social benefit 
of private investment exceeds that of public investment in SOC, the 
government simply invests in private capital in either sectors 2 or 3, 
The private investors allocate their investment funds in a manner that 
takes full account of the government placed investmsnts^ and 
Thus, the same result Mould ensue if the government simply transferred tax 
revenue to the private investors' budget and allowed these investors to 
allocate the funds. 
In the next chapter, a model of a dualistic economy is formulated 
in which the government has control over the allocation of private savings. 
In addition, the government still has the tax budget which may be used for 
either investment in SOC or for additions to the private capital stock. 
Any income earned on the capital stock is invested in further capital 
accumulation. Thus, both private and public investments are controlled 
by the government. This model is termed the centralized dual-economy 
model. 
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CHAPTER IV. ANALYSIS OF THE CENTRALIZED MODEL 
In this chapter, the decentralized model is reformulated in a manner 
that will simplify the first-order conditions for the maximum without 
appreciably altering many of the basic features of the original model. 
The simplification facilitates the economic analysis of the optimum 
conditions. The major portion of this chapter is devoted to an intensive 
analysis of the nature of the solution to the requirements for an optimum. 
A Reformulation of the Model 
In this section the decentralized model is modified so that the role 
of the government planners is expanded to include control over the alloca­
tion of private investment funds. These investment funds are allocated 
among the alternatives in a manner consistent with maximization of the 
objective function. This modification simplifies the problem considerably 
in some respects while the very restrictive assumption of balanced private 
investment in every period is relaxed= In the new formulation it is not 
assumed that investment takes place in all three sectors in every period. 
A number of features of the model remain virtually unchanged. One 
of the aspects that must be modified, however, is the nature of the 
provisions made to assure adequate post-plan productive capacity. An 
incentive to invest in the last period of the plan is induced through a 
modification of the welfare function. A positive weight is attached to 
post terminal productive capacity (GNP) evaluated at period t prices. 
Letting T = t the new welfare function is denoted as 
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,2 
V = - '22C2c)(l + 
-•• «(fiT'.cïr# '-°? -•• - 0«)VS^2?'S 
All parameters and variables are defined as in Chapter IIj with the 
only new parameter, 8, indicating the weight or emphasis placed on the 
provision for future generations. This welfare function is maximized 
subject to the following set of constraints which apply to each period 
(t = 1, ... , T) . 
• "s'LC'-sl ("•'> 
ht - <"•» 
ht ' 
ht ' (4.S) 
\ ° "^ st ht s^t ht •'• 2^t St (4.6) 
^st^lt^-^lt (4-7) 
"2t ""st "U ^  "zt Vc St (4.8) 
S t  - S t -  S t  " 3 t  (4-9) 
»(StSt(i-°i' -'-StSt"-»!) +St(i-^i) -^StSt(i-S) 
-!• «(£3, -:- = "(i;,, + £1,) + Pj.I, (4.10) 
°lStSt=St (4.U) 
S StSt-St (4-12) 
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¥3t'3t = (4.14) 
= ht" (4.15) 
V'2. - ht" 
V3t^3t = (4.17) 
(l-««°2"°4)^s-/lt -•• Vltht •'- ¥2£ V3t^t 
»(£,,-i-V ) - PiAt •:• St (4-18) 
(l-«((B3ve,)Pj,Yj^  -:- •;• S^ 3t^ '3tl- -3t^  
= '•3t (ht-^ -2t«3t' (4-"> 
C, > 1 (4.20) 
It -
C > 1 (4.21) 
In addition, the following definitions apply to variables appearing in 
(4;3)-(4.6): 
t-1 
G = G Z L . (4.22) 
St si . , SI 
1=1 
Gjt=6ii + '/£i, (4.23) 
1 = 1 
K = Ij, (4.24) 
1=1 





Many of these equations remain unchanged from Chapter II and are 
repeated at this point for convenience. The principal difference between 
this model and the decentralized model outlined in Chapter II involves 
the role of the government in the investment sector. The government now 
is assumed to have control over the expenditures to be made from two 
budgetsp the tax budget (4»10) and the savings budget (4.19). Revenue or 
purchasing power can be transferred from the tax budget to the savings 
budget to be used for the purchase of capital goods. The amount of the 
transfer in each period is denoted as I,. However^ private savings 
JC c 
(income earned on capital goods) cannot be transferred to the tax budget. 
In every period, the government has control over the variables 
L. 5 I, 2 I .2 and I « The placement of capital goods is no longer 
it t i"C Z l.  
subject to the allocation rules outlined in Chapter II and expressed in 
(2.43) and (2.44). As a consequence, the government in this model has 
much more power and, hence? control over the development of the economy. 
The changes in (4.9) and definitions (4.25) and (4.26) relative to 
their counterparts in Chapter II are self explanatory. The modification 
of the welfare function (4.1) is designed to provide an incentive to 
invest in productive capacity for the future by imputing a social value 
to the productive capacity bequeathed to subsequent generations. 
The First-Order Conditions 
The optimization of this model proceedsj as before^ applying the 
Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions to the Lagrangean function formed with 
(4.1) as the maximand and (4.2)-(4.21) as the constraints. The definitions 
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(4„22)-(4„26) are assumed to be eliminated by substitution but the 
variables defined are retained for notational convenience. Consequently, 
these equations do not appear in the Lagrangean function. 
The Lagrangean function is not presented. Let X denote the 
Lagrangean multipliers and define T = T-l. The following first-order 
conditions result: 
- 4 - ''-18 -1 ''20 ' ° (4.27) 
= <''2-"l2^ r-"22"2^  - -8 - "18 ••• -21 = ° <4.28) 
Vy - -^2 ^7 = 0 
s 
(4.29) 
^7 hV-'? --Uh hsh '"l8»2<l-« 
(l-i(j) (3^+13^) } = 0 (4.30) 
= -=^ 4 + ^ 8 %10*(l-'l) - %13'l ''16^ 2 •• %18(l-»)"2 
+ X^g(l-^)Tg = 0 (4.31) 
3^ ° -^ 5 + ''s - =<14'1 '<17'2 %18(t-^ )'2 
4- X^g(l-^)&^} = 0 (4.32) 
V = " ^ 8 1^1 " ° (4.33) 
s 
Vp = - Kg + Xi2 " ° (4.34) 
Vp = X4TiY2/F2 - %8 * ^13 " ° (^.35) 
Vp = - Xg + X^  ^= 0 (t=l, ..., T-1) (4.36) 
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V_ = X„a Y / i ,  -  X = 0 (-c=i., . . .  .  T-1) (4.37) 
L Z Z s s D 
s 
V = X B„Y_/L - X - X ~ 0 (^=1; .«.: T-I) (4.38) J  Z  1  1  D  I d  
V_ = X.Y.Y_/L_ - X - X, w = 0 (C=l, T_i) (4.39) 
4  2  2  2  D  1 0  
Vj = - X^ - X.yW = 0 (t=l, T_l) (4.40) 
- "11°A - -12¥I 
- i -  ( 1  - t | j )  ( 3 ^ ) =  0  ( c = l j  .  .  :  T - 1 )  ( 4 . 4 1 )  
Vp, = - I) - Xl4ai?3 %17a273 + %18(l-^)(2?3 
+ X^g{(l-^)62Y3 + I - - Ï2 " I3) " ° T-1) (4.42) 
V; = P3(Xig - X^g) < 0; IV_ = 0; I  > 0 (4.43) 
' \ j. , - ''6t 
st 1—t--i 




-:- u(i-»)(Xig; - x^ ot) - ' "• ht- " (4.45) 
- h9t^3t - "5 ht\^ ' "• "it : ° (4.46) 
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- : »• = »• "^ 2t ; » (4.47) 
V . » 63 I .S5,Ï3,/K3,) - X,, 
jc 1—t'.'i 
- ':if3c : »• ^ 3t'T . = »• St : ° (4.48) 
3 c 
The following special conditions apply to the final period of the plan, 
'F3, = ®"'lT°l°sSs/sr'l's? - 0 ••• %2T'l%sT/fs, - ==8, ••• hu ' 0(4.33a) 
Vp,, " - » ••• h^Vu'^^U 
'^"ST ^12% ~ ^ (4.34a) 
Vp,, = - e v - Xg, 
+ X ^ = 0 (4.35a) 
'E3, = - f - Xg, 
+ = 0 (4.36a) 
\ ' «^ T°2°s=s/si''sr' ••• - =6T - » (4.37.) 
ST 
- = 0 (4.38a) 
«L,, = '^ 2(l- = >^ °2^ 2^ ïr'4l •'• %4,72?2T/"2T " %6T 
- XiGT^ = 0 (4.39a) 
- = 0 (4.40a) 
Vp;., - ®<°s4C"^S + -10T*Kt<'-V ••• ?lt(l-*l)' 
-  hl.Vs. - -UrVlr -•• hs^Vl. ••• - I 3 T ' < l - « [ < " 2 n > \ T  
+ 82?!?] - = 0 (4.412) 
'^p, • •- - 4' - "l4T'i*3. 
_>T 
':l7T°2"3n ••• '' 'l9T ' ¥3^  ^ ' ^IT 
- I,? - = 0 (4.42a) 
To avoid confusion with the first-order conditions presented in 
Chapter III, the letter X is used to denote the Lagrangean multipliers. 
As before, the subscripts on the Lagrangean multipliers indicate the 
equations and time period with which they are associated. The remainder 
of this chapter is devoted to an analysis of the economic implications of 
these first-order conditions. 
SOC Accumulation 
In any period t, if it is desirable for the government to invest in 
SOC in the subsistence sector, then from (4.44) we have the result that 
'•*lr%%llCKr * \ ' (hot - + %6c' i=t-M 
(4.44a) 
where represents the social marginal value of additional subsistence 
agricultural production in period i > t. X.g^ is the marginal social 
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value of additional consumer income generated in period t by employing 
labor in SOC accumulation, and ][ and X. , represent the social 
opportunity costs of labor and government purchasing power, respectively. 
Comparing (4.44a) with its analogue (3.25) obtained for the 
decentralized model discussed in Chapters II and III, it becomes apparent 
that the only difference between the two is thac the first term in (4.44a) 
is absent from (3.25). This first term represents the value society 
places on the marginal value productivity of SOC in post-plan productive 
capacity in the subsistence sector. Since the value of this terra is 
positive, it appears that the likelihood that it would be socially 
desirable to invest in SOC in sector s is greater when capacity is given 
a positive value than in the case of the decentralized economy model 
where the social value of terminal productive capacity is not taken into 
account. However, this is not necessarily true since a positive value 
is placed on all post-plan productive capacity. The net resuit is that 
the social opportunity costs associated with the use of resources to 
accumulate SOC will also increase. 
Turning now to the commercial agricultural sector, the condition 
which must be satisfied if is to be positive is 
i=t-;-i 
+ u(l-^)(X^o^ - X^g^). (4.45a) 
Comparing this.condition with (4.44a), we see that society is indifferent 
between the post-terminal marginal productivity of SOC of che two agri­




Some simplifying assumptions and notation 
To simplify notation in the remainder of chis section, let T = T-:-1 




^^T " ^1?^ " ^3T" (4.51) 
Making the appropriate substitutions into (4.44a) and (4.45a) we get^ ' 
\ O'lot - -I8c) <4.52) 
l=L:-ri 
and 
A Z ' "6t <''lOt - =18,) <4.53) 
l=t-rl 
From (4.52) and (4.53) and the accompanying footnote, it is apparent 
that the decision to invest in SOC in either the subsistence or commercial 
agricultural sector depends on which of two weighted sums of two sets of 
ratios is larger. These ratios are the output/SOC ratios in each sector. 
Further, the weights applied to the ratios of the two sectors in each 
^^Suppose that the planning horizon is extended to TX-1 periods. 
This would result in values for F^^ and being "competitively" deter­
mined along with a corresponding output of If it is assumed that 
F = F _ and L = L , then the variable defined in (4.50) is 
o i S I ox s ^ 
approximately equal to Y^^ as it would be competitively determined. The 
same considerations apply to (4.49). 
period are the same. That is, 
"2t = T-M) (4.54) 
since X is the marginal social value of agricultural production in the 
subsistence sector while is the same quantity in the commercial agri­
cultural sector. These two quantities mast be equal since agricultural 
goods produced by these two sectors are perfect substitutes in consump­
tion. Thus, deciding whether or not to invest in either subsistence or 
commercial agricultural SOC (or both) involves a comparison of two sets 
of ratios, Y^./GL. and Y ./G . (i = t-I-l. ..., T-ri), These two sets of 
li li si SI 
ratios and their influences on the two sums in (4.52) and (4.53) are the 
subject of much of the remainder of this section. 
One of the characteristics of dual economies is that a substantial 
portion of the labor force is usually employed in subsistence agricul­
ture and L > 1^ . Since the total labor supuly is assumed to be fixed 
St It 
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and perfectly inelastic, and since L is a residual it follows that as 
^ St 
the economy develops^^ the supply of labor available to be employed in 
the subsistence sector declines, or L ,, < L . i > 0. Assuming for 
s, t-rl St 
the moment that the terms of trade (TT) between agricultural and manu­
factured goods remain constant and that no investment in subsistence SOC 
occurs in the first t periods (that is, = 0, i=l, ..., t), then 
Y ,/G , > Y ./G . (i=2, ..., t) (4.55) 
si si - SI SI 
These assumptions are relaxed in Chapter VI. 
That is ; as capital accumulates in the other sectors. 
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since G , =  G  . and Y ^ > Y . because L . < L From (4.11) and the 
si SI si - SI SI - si 
assumption of constant TT, the effect of purchased manufactured inputs 
cannot offset the effect of the decrease in the labor employed in the 
subsistence sector. 
Turning now to the commercial agricultural sector, assume constant 
ince TT and no investment in SGC in the first t periods „ T h u s  s  
. = 0, i = 1J ,..5 t. If there has been no investment in private 
capital in the agricultural sector in the first t periods (that is, 
I = Oj i = Ij ..., t), then K _ = K . Combining the assumptions 
JL 1. i. P L."" i. a. X 
of no private or public investment in the first t periods with the 
constant terms of trade assumption implies that and - F^^, 
and therefore 
; (1=2, t). (4.56) 
The results in (4.55) and (4.56) suggest that the absolute rate of 
déclin- of the social value of subsistence SOC diminishes over time 
relative to the absolute rate of decline of the social value of commer­
cial SOC. This can be demonstrated as follows» Define the two sums in 
(4.52) and (4.53) as 
T'1-1 
= Z (X_.Y ./G .) (4.57) 
t ... 1 2i SI SI 
and 
B = Z (X .Y ./G .). (4.58) 
The absolute rates of decline of these sums between periods t-1 and t are 
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ana. 
\-l - \ = 
Forming a  ratio of these differences and examining the ratio over time; 
we see that for i > t 
with the strict inequality holding if declines over time. The 
significance of (4.61) is discussed after the implicai;ions of some of 
the foregoing simplifying assumptions are examined. 
Relaxing: the simplifying assumptions 
Relaxing the assumption that no investment has taken place in 
private capital in the commercial agriculture sector merely augments the 
result expressed in (4.61). If investment occurs in commercial agricul­
ture, then (4.56) is modified to become 
< Yii/Gii : (i=2, t). (4.56a) 
Next, relaxing the assumption that the TT are constant and assuming 
the TT move in favor of agriculture (P^ 1 ^ ^It^ i > 0) has a similar 
effect on (4.56) since at the higher prices more commercial agricultural 
production will be forthcoming. However, changing of the TT over time 
has an additional influence on the ratios in (4.61) via the response of 
subsistence production to price changes. If the subsistence response is 
perverse,this would tend to augment the inequality expressed in (4.55) 
^^See the discussion of supply response in Chapter 
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and, consequently also contribute to the decline of the ratios in (4.61). 
On the other hand, if supply response is positive, this would tend to 
offset the influence of the natural outflow of labor from the subsistence 
sector as the "rest of the economy develops". For present purposes, 
assume that if the supply response is positive5 this positive response is 
not sufficient to offset the effect of the outflow of labor„ Thus5 even, 
if the TT move in favor of agriculture, Y will decline in the absence of 
investment in subsistence SOC, 
The one remaining possibility is the case where the TT move against 
the agricultural sectors. Retaining the assumption of no investment in 
SOC5 consider first the case where there is no investment in private 
capital in the commercial agricultural sector. If there is no investment 
in agriculture and the price of agricultural goods declines^ the output 
of agricultural goods must fall by the nature of the aggregate supply 
response in these sectors. Not only is this unlikely to occur because of 
the nature of the relative marginal social utilities discussed in Chapter 
II, but the possibility of aggregate agricultural production falling below 
the initial output level is explicitly excluded by (4.20). Therefore, if 
the price of agricultural goods declines this decline must be the result 
of expanded production and not the cause of decreased output. Expanded 
output of agricultural goods concurrent with declining prices can occur 
only if there is investment in either SOC or in private commercial capital 
goods. Thus, if the TT are moving against the agricultural sector and 
there hasn't been any investment in SOC, then there must be investment in 
private commercial agricultural capital. This means that aggregate 
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production is increasing in the face of declining prices. In this 
situation, Y /G must be declining while Y, /G^ is increasing. 
' St St It It 
This is precisely the same set of results that are obtained under the 
assumptions of private investment with constant TT and thus the results 
are the same as in (4.61). 
The significance of A. and B, 
t J: 
Turning now to the implications of (4.61), this inequality suggests 
that the absolute rate of decline of over time decreases relative to 
the absolute rate of decline of B,. Assume again, for the moment, that 
the TT are constant and no investment is occurring in private capital in 
88 
the commercial agricultural sector. Assume further that is 
89 
constant over time. These assumptions suggest that B^ declines at a 
constant absolute rate while the absolute rate of decline of A,_ decreases 
Plotting A^ and on a graph (where time is treated as a continuum) 
leads to six possibilities, five of which are shown on Figure 4.1. These 
five possibilities are as follows: (1) A^ is always above B, and the 
curves do not cross; (2) B^ is always above A^ and the curves do not 
cross; (3) A^ crosses B^ once from below; (4) A^ crosses B^ once from 
above, and; (5) A^ crosses B^ twice, first from above and then from below 
The sixth possibility is that the curves touch (become tangent) but do 
not cross. 
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This is the case where (4.56) holds rather than (4.56a). 
89 
These assumptions are relaxed currently. 
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time 
Figure 4.1. A and with assumptions of no investment and constant TT 
Relaxing the assumption about investing in private commercial agri­
culture and allowing the TT to move in favor of agricultural goods merely 
has the effect of allowing to increase over time and the influence 
of (4.56a) replaces (4.56) in determining the rates of decline expressed 
in (4.61). Graphically, this simply has the effect of bending the 
straight line B so that it becomes strictly concave downward. The net 
result is that the range of possibilities with respect to crossing 
combinations remains unchanged. Furthermore, it is asserted that relaxing 
tile assumption that = X is constant has no essential influence on 
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the nature of the crossing possibilities since allowing these values to 
vary over time simply changes the curvature of the two curves and does 
not alter the number of crossing possibilities. 
Turning now to the significance of these curves5 recall that the 
object of this exercise is to determine whether SOC investment will 
occur in any period t, and, if so, whether it will be in the subsistence 
sector, the commercial sector, or both. The criterion involved in this 
decision is the magnitude of AA^ and AB. relative to the social oppor­
tunity cost of using government funds in alternative uses as expressed in 
(4.52) and (4.53). In terms of Figure 4.1, this means that if the social 
opportunity cost in any one period is sufficiently low, then investment 
may occur in one or both of the SOC alternatives. The case where it is 
socially desirable to invest in commercial SOC is illustrated in Figure 
4.2; where denotes the net social opportunity cost as defined by the 
right hand side of (4.52) or (4.53). The A and curves represent 
only one of the possibilities with respect to relative locations. At 
time t = t'; the social benefit to be derived (at the margin) from 
investing in SOC in commercial agriculture exceeds that of investing in 
subsistence SOC. If, as illustrated, the value of C., lies between , 
and A^,, then it is socially desirable to invest in commercial SOC but 
not in subsistence SOC in period t'. If was less than then it 
would be desirable to invest in SOC in both sectors. These considerations 
exemplify the importance of the relative location of the A^ and curves. 
In discussing the possible shapes of the two curves it was assumed 













Figure 4.2. The decision to invest in SOC 
relaxed, the problem becomes slightly more complicated since the curves 
begin to shift. Consider the following case which is illustrated for 
time t' in Figure 4.2. Given the positions of the A and curves 
relative to C^,, it is desirable to invest in commercial SOC in period t'. 
However, such an investment shifts the location of the B curve since, by 
definition, is a weighted average of the ratio of commercial production 
to commercial SOC. Increasing the value of the denominator in this ratio 
tends to shift the curve downwards. However, the downward influence is 
partially offset by the increase in the output of commercial agriculture 
(the numerator of the ratio) associated with the increased SOC and the 
correspondingly higher level of purchased manufactured and labor inputs. 
The net effect is that the ratio Y../G_ must fall if G is increased iC it, IL 
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because of the diminishing marginal productivity of SOC. 
Expanded commercial sector SOC has a further downward influence on 
. Expanded agricultural output results in a decline in the marginal 
social value of agricultural goods in all subsequent periods^ and it is 
this value (X^^) which forms the weights in Since the marginal social 
value of agricultural output is the same for the commercial and subsis­
tence sectors, investment in commercial SOC also tends to shift the 
curve downward. 
Turning now to the question of the extent of the downward shift, 
must continue to shift downward until the value of B , falls to the level 
t ' 
C^,. This is apparent from (4.53). If there are sufficient government 
funds available to drive , as low as then simultaneous investment 
in both subsistence and commercial SOC becomes socially desirable. Thus, 
if in any period t, investment occurs in both G  .^ and G_ ,^, then 
^ Sjtvl l,u+l 
A^ = B^ as is apparent from (4,52) and (4,53). 
Economic considerations influencing the desirability of investing in 
subsistence versus commercial SOC 
Having discussed the general shape and the importance of the relative 
locations of the A^ and B^ curves, we now examine the economic factors 
which determine the relative locations of these curves and attempt to 
isolate features of dualistic economies which would tend to make one 
curve lie above (or below) the other. In discussing the determinants 
of the location of these curves, it is preferable to start with the 
terminal period of the plan (i) and working towards the start of the 
planning period since Lhe value of includes all of the terms of A , 
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(i >0) plus some additional terms. 
Letting T = T-M, it is apparent from (4.49)-(4.51); (4.58) and 
(4.59) that 
A = P, Go (4.57e) 
T IT S IT ST ST 
and 
It is the relative magnitudes of these two terms which determines the 
relative values of the ordinates corresponding to the abscissa value of 
T-i-l for the two curves and in Figures 4.1 and 4.2. Since for 
present purposes we are only interested in relative magnitudes, the 
common factors P, 6 can be ignored. 
IT 
Recalling the definitions of the production function intercepts from 
Chapter II, we have a = o and = ouB^^ where B and B, are the 
^  s s s  1 1 1  s  1  
quantities of land in the subsistence and commercial agricultural sectors, 
rPopectively. The relative size of and unquestionably varies 
greatly from country to country. However, the portion of the land that 
is farmed by mechanized means in many of the underdeveloped countries is 
small relative to that which is farmed by traditional means. Since the 
land in the traditional sector is frequently more intensively farmed than 
land that which is on plantations, it was assumed in Chapter II that the 
productivity of land in the subsistence sector was higher than in the 
commercial sector. Another interpretation is that the share of the output 
attributable to land (ot ) is larger in the subsistence sector than the 
portion attributable to land in the commercial sector (^). Based on 
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these assumptions, we have 
(4.62) 
To the extent that the commercial sector uses more modern and; 
hence, more productive techniques than the subsistence sector^ the influence 
of land will be offset to some extent by the larger "index of technology". 
In other words, it is likely that a < because more modern and 
efficient practices are being used on the commercial farms. An additional 
offsetting factor is the influence of mechanization in the commercial 
sector. This influence is represented by From (2.21) and (2.23) 
we have B Y /L > (a„-l-a, )Y ,/L ^ , and since g < (a„n-a, ) it follows 
Z iL IC Z'4-SLSL Z JL o. 
that ,/L_ > Y ^/L Even though it is assumed that L > 
It It st St St It' 
since < g it is impossible to determine on the basis of these 
assumptions whether exceeds in any particular period. Finally, 
from (4.11) and (4.12) and the assumption that it follows that 
Y_^/F, = Y /F , Co^^eouently the magnitudes of F^^ and F.^/ are pro-
it it St sc " St It ' 
portional to the relative magnitudes of Y and Y^_. 
Bringing all these considerations together^ it follows that the 
larger the relative size of the subsistence labor force relative to the 
commercial agricultural labor force, the larger will be relative to 
B . Similarly, the larger relative to the larger will tend 
to be relative to Counterbalancing these two items, the larger the 
capital stock in commercial agriculture (K^^) and the greater the dis­
parity between the productivity of subsistence and commercial techniques 
(a versus a,), the larger B will tend to be relative to A . The 
s I T T 
influence of purchased inputs varies with the relative size (measured in 
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terms of output) of the two sectors. Thus, the relative values of A and 
vary directly with the relative sizes of all the foregoing factors. 
The only exception is the size of compared with The relative 
sizes of A and B vary inversely with the relative quantities of SOC 
available in the two sectors. 
Why all the concern over A and B since these are terminal values 
T T 
and no further investment in SOC can occur during the plan? The reason is 
that Af and Bx form the base for all earlier values of A and B^. This 
becomes obvious when A and B are considered. Ue have from (4.59) 
T- I T - 1 
for the subsistence sector that 
(4.575) 
and from (4.60) for the commercial sector we have 
B , = X. Y, /G, -l-B . (4.58b) 
T-1 3T IT IT T 
Thu s ; the larger A^ relative to B^, the larger A ^ will be relative to 
B • In comparing the two additional terms in (4.57b) and (4.58b), the 
same factors of components have the same influence as in A and B^. 
This becomes obvious when these terms are rewritten as 
Y /G = ô (4.63) 
ST ST S ST ST ST ST 
and 
Ylt/GlT = (4.64) 
Finally, replacing T by t in (4.63) and (4.64) it is obvious that the 
same variables and parameters have similar influences throughout the 
entire period. 
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Summary and conclusions 
In summary, the following conclusions appear to be relevant in 
consideration of the relative desirability of investing in subsistence 
or commercial sector SOC. (1) The larger the total labor force, 
relative to the resource base of the economy (land and fixed capital 
stock) the relatively more desirable it is to invest in subsistence SOC. 
(2) The larger the proportion of the total land base used for subsistence 
forms of production, the more attractive investment in subsistence SOC 
becomes relative to investment in commercial sector SOC. (3) There is a 
certain amount of complementarity between investing in private capital in 
the commercial sector and the desirability of investing in G^. In other 
words, private investment in tends to make investment in more 
desirable. (4) To the extent that the commercial sector employs more 
modern and more productive techniques than the subsistence sector, it will 
be relatively more desirable to invest in G^ rather than , (5) Invest­
ment in either G^ or G^ in any period, tends to reduce the relative 
desirability of investing in SOC in that sector in subsequent periods. 
(6) Finally, it is impossible to determine a priori whether it is more 
desirable to develop subsistence or commercial agriculture or which should 
be developed first. 
The discussion throughout this entire section has been conducted in 
terms of the relative desirability of choosing between two alternatives. 
At no point was investing in G^ rather than G^ (or vice versa) advocated. 
This decision cannot be made in the absence of data on the magnitudes of 
the various parameters and variables. Furthermore, the discussion in this 
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section almost completely abstracted from consideration of the social 
opportunity costs involved. As indicated above^ the decision in any one 
period will depend on the relative magnitude of and the social 
opportunity cost of using government tax revenue for SOC accumulation. 
One of the major factors influencing this social opportunity cost is dis­
cussed in the following section. Specifically, this factor is the social 
desirability of transferring tax revenue to the private savings budget. 
This social desirability depends directly on the private investment 
opportunities available. 
Private Capital Accumulation 
The allocation of private investment funds in this model is governed 
by the criterion of social desirability. This criterion differs from the 
criterion used in the decentralized model of maximization of the expected 
income earned on the capital stock in the subsequent period. The applica­
tion of the social desirability criterion to the investment alternatives 
is summarized in the first-order conditions (4.46)-(4.48). The social 
desirability of transferring revenue from the tax budget to the private 
savings budget is summarized in condition (4.43). The problem of trans­
ferring these funds is deferred until a later section. This section con­
tains a discussion of the allocation of private investment funds. The 
method of analysis is similar to that employed in the previous section on 
SOC accumulation. 
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The relative social desirability of investmenc alternatives 
To simplify the analysis notation similar to that used in the 
previous section is introduced. Letting T = define 
= 8, (4.65) 
Xg? = (4.66) 
n2(l+c)?FY;LY2KY|-l = (4.67) 
and 
03(l+E)TF*;La2l(6|-l = Y,,VK„. (4.68) 
Using this notation and the definitions of X and in (4.49) 
and (4.51); we can rewrite parts of the conditions in (4.46)-(4.48) in 




^3 . J, : St 'h9t^3c (4-47=) 
l = t-l-l 
and 
S . ',,(%si'3i/K3i) : (4.48a) 
i=t':-i 
The remainder of the conditions in (4.46) require that if investment in 
^ is to be desirable in period t, (i.e., it is deemed desirable for 
Ito be positive) then the LHS of (4.46a) must be equal in magnitude to 
the RHS of (4.46a). In other words, if investment is socially desirable 
in period t, then the discounted present marginal social value produc­
tivity of private capital in commercial agriculture in all successive 
periods plus the social value of post-plan productive capacity must be 
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equal to the social opportunity costs of using investment goods and 
private savings in this manner. Similar interpretations apply to (4.47a) 
and (4.48a). 
Economic factors affecting; private investment 
Making detailed comparisons among the desirability of the three 
private investment alternatives is more difficult than analyzing the two 
alternatives available for investment in SOC. This enhanced difficulty 
results from the greater asymmetry involved in the choices among the 
private investment alternatives. One troublesome aspect of this asymmetry 
is that the products produced by the three sectors all have their own 
marginal social value. Thus, comparison among physical characteristics is 
no longer sufficient as in the decision between investing in either or 
G . The relative values of X_ , X, , and X,. must be considered in com-
s 3t 4t bt 
paring the relative magnitudes of the LHS of (4.64a)-(4.48a). 
The allocation of the private savings among the three alternative 
sectors requires that investment must occur in at least one of these 
sectors in every period. This differs from the problem of deciding 
between or G^ for SOC investment. In the allocation of government 
funds it was possible that investment might not occur in either G^ or G 
Is
in a particular period since the entire tax budget could be transferred 
to the private savings fund and used to accumulate private capital. No 
similar transfer option is possible for private savings. Consequently 
capital must be accumulated in at least one sector. Thus, the social 
opportunity cost of placing capital (X^^ -r cannot exceed the 
102 
largest of the terms on the LrlS of conditions (4.46a)-(4.48a). if 
investment occurs in more than one sector, the values of the LHS of the 
90 
conditions (4.46a)-(4.48a) corresponding to these sectors must be equal. 
Investment, however, will be socially desirable in only those sectors for 
which the value of the LHS of the conditions equals the social opportunity 
cost. This equality will prevail only in those sectors with the larger 
values on the LHS. Thus, it becomes important to determine which economic 
factors contribute to increasing the value of the LHS of the conditions. 
The share of capital One of the more obvious elements to be con­
sidered is the relative magnitudes of the three parameters y., and 6^ . 
From (4.46a)- (4.48a) it is obvious that the larger any one of these 
parameters is relative to the other two, the relatively more desirable it 
becomes to have a higher (rather than lower) capital/output ratio in that 
sector. In other words, the larger the share of output attributable to 
capital in a particular sector, the higher the optimum capital/output 
ratio becomes relative to other sectors. 
Social valuation of outputs The desirability of increasing the 
capital/output ratio in the various sectors is strongly influenced by the 
social values attached to the outputs of the three sectors X , X , and 
X . The social value of capital goods production (X^) is an indirect or 
imputed social value since capital goods do not enter the welfare function 
directly except in the evaluation of post-terminal productive capacity. 
_ 
The principal advantage of this formulation over that used in the 
decentralized model is that investment does not have to occur in all 
sectors in every period as previously assumed. This relaxes a very restric 
rive and unrealistic assumption. 
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Since capital goods are not consumed in this model, the production of 
capital goods is socially desirable only from the standpoint of the 
increased production and consumption of agricultural and manufactured 
goods made possible in subsequent periods through the accumulation of 
capital. At the other extreme, agricultural output is used for consump­
tion purposes only. Consequently, the social value of agricultural 
production is derived strictly from direct consumption benefits and no 
indirect value is imputed to agricultural production in this model. 
Between the extremes exemplified by agricultural and capital goods is 
the social valuation of manufactured production. Since manufactured 
goods are used both for consumption and as a factor of production, X. 
contains elements of both direct and indirect social value. The 
differences in the nature of the social values of the products of these 
sectors results from the different contributions the three types of output 
make to social welfare. A positive social value on capital goods produc­
tion expresses a concern for expanded future consumption, while a 
positive value for agricultural or manufacturing production expresses a 
concern for present welfare. 
Comparisons among the relative magnitudes of the three social 
values is difficult because of the nature of the considerations involved. 
The easier comparison is between and X since intertemporal considera­
tions are not explicitly involved within periods. During the initial 
periods of the plan the magnitude of X might be expected to exceed the 
magnitude of X^. Based on the assumptions about the welfare function dis­
cussed in Chapter II, the marginal social utility of an additional unit of 
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is assumed to exceed the marginal social utility of C in the early 
periods of the plan. This implies that ][ - X > . This is true even 
9 1  
though manufactured goods are also used as factors of production. it 
cannot be assumed that the relative magnitudes of X and will remain 
unchanged throughout the planning period. The marginal welfare derived 
from the consumption of additional units of agricultural goods declines 
more rapidly than the marginal welfare of additional manufactured goods 
consumption. The ratio X^. /X^ may decline over time if both agricultural 
and manufactured goods production increase over time. However, this need 
not be the case if the ratio declines over time at a sufficiently 
rapid rate. 
In summary, during the initial periods of the plan it may be 
expected that X^^ = X > X^^. However, the magnitude of this inequality 
can be expected to decrease over time unless the production of manufactured 
goods expands sufficiently more rapidly than agricultural production so 
that the ratio of dcclincs rapidly enough to offset the 
differential rates at which the marginal welfares diminish. 
It is more difficult to make meaningful comparisons of X and X^^ 
or X^^ than to make comparisons between X^^ and X^. Comparisons 
involving X require consideration of the social value of present versus 
future consumption since the value of X^^ is an imputed value which is 
9 1  
The social utility of using manufactured goods in consumption must 
equal the social utility of using them as factors of production if the 
allocation is optimum. In other words, the marginal social utility of 
consuming manufactured goods is equal to the marginal social opportunity 
cost of not consuming them. 
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derived from the expansion of consumption of manufactured and agricultural 
goods made possible» The intertemporal aspect of the problem arises 
because the social payoff for the production of capital goods in period 
t cannot be realized as expanded consumption before period t+l. Thus, 
if the society places a high premium on present consumption relative to 
future consumption, the value of will be somewhat lower than if society 
was relatively less concerned with shorter term satisfactions. The 
magnitude of X^,_ is strongly influenced by the social rate of discount, 
P, which is chosen by the policy-maker to reflect society's intertemporal 
preferences with respect to consumption. As society places greater 
emphasis on present rather than future consumption, this will be reflected 
in the model through the choice of a higher value of p. An increase in 
the social rate of discount will result in a decline in the social value 
of capital accumulation, X . The other parameter in the model which 
reflects society's intertemporal preferences is the weight given to 
post-plan productive capacity, 0. A greater concern by society to 
bequeath a large productive capacity to future generations is reflected 
in the model by an increase in 8. This terminal productive capacity 
must, to some extent, be acquired at the expense of current consumption. 
Consequently, an increase in the magnitude of 6 leads to a concomitant 
increase in the social value of capital goods production, X^. 
Thus, the value of X^ is determined to a large extent by the social 
rate of discount and the relative emphasis given to terminal productive 
capacity. While the analysis of the consequences of choosing particular 
values for these parameters is an economic problem, the actual choice of 
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the values of the parameters is essentially a political question 
involving the ethics of the well-being of current versus future genera­
tions as well as the problem of current versus delayed consumption within 
the present generation. 
Finally, the problem of comparing the relative magnitudes of X and 
X, with X^ involves many diverse and difficult considerations such as 
4 5 
levels of production of the three goods as well as the relative rates of 
expansion of C,. and C„. . The most difficult oroblem. however, arises 
lu zt ' 
from the intertemporal aspects of current versus delayed consumption. In 
general terms it appears that as relatively more emphasis is placed on 
current rather than future consumption, less emphasis will be placed on 
the accumulation of capital goods and the absolute and relative levels of 
and C become proportionately more important in determining the alloca­
tion of investment. Concomitant with this is reduced emphasis on expan­
sion of capital goods capacity as reflected by a lower value for X . 
The rate of technical change and SOG accumulation The only terms 
on the LHS of (4.46a)-(4.48a) remaining to be considered are the output/ 




Since the numerators of the ratios in (4.69)-(4.71) involve different 
units of account, the only meaningful comparisons among these ratios 
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involve those factors which will tend to change the relative magnitudes 
of these ratios over time. 
The most obvious factor is the rate of technical chance, e, in the 
manufacturing and capital goods sector relative to the rate of SOC 
accumulation in commercial agriculture. The "effective" rate of SOC 
accumulation is 
Since e >0, the productive influence of SOC accumulation in commercial 
agriculture may be greater than, equal to, or less than the exogenous 
rate of technical change in the manufacturing and capital goods sectors. 
Denote the LHS of (4.72) as ^G/G. If ÛG/G > e, then private capital 
accumulation in the agricultural sector would be relatively more 
desirable than if AG/G < e. This is because, ceteris paribus, the larger 
the rate of increase of the output/capital ratio in a sector, the rela­
tively more desirable it will be to expand the capital stock in that 
sector. While e is a constant AG/G may vary over time. Consequently 
SOC accumulation will have a varied influence over time on the relative 
92 desirability of private investment in commercial agriculture. 
Changes in the terms of trade The remaining elements in (4.69) 
-(4.71) that can alter the output/capital ratios are the inputs of manu­
factured goods and labor. From (4.12)-(4.17) it is apparent that the 
92 
This complementarity between SOC and private investment in commer­




(4.72 % J 
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influence of these factors is determined by the TT over time. Since 
=  1 ,  the output/capital ratio in the manufacturing sector may be 
treated as a numeraire. If increases over time, it will become 
profitable to employ larger amounts of labor " .d manufactured inputs in 
this sector, which will tend to increase Y /K relative to Y /K . 
i t i t  Z'C Zc 
This increase in the output/capital ratio in commercial agriculture will 
tend to make investment in this sector relatively more desirable than 
investment in manufacturing. The opposite result ensues if P^^ declines 
over time. Similarly, changes in P over time will have analogous 
implications for the relative desirability of investing in the capital 
goods sector. Thus, as the TT move in favor of a particular sector, this 
will tend to make investment in that sector socially more desirable since 




In this section, the allocation of private investment funds has been 
analyzed. An attempt was made to delineate the economic, physical, and 
technical conditions of an economy which will tend to make investment in 
each of the three sectors socially desirable. The following conclusions 
regarding certain economic and technical considerations appear to be 
relevant in deciding upon the relative social desirability of investing in 
9 3  
Note that these results coincide with the assumptions made about 
private investment behavior in Chapter II. This coincidence suggests the 
results regarding the allocation of investment funds in the present 
"centralized" model do not differ appreciably from the results that would 
be obtained from the more complex "decentralized" model. 
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one or more of the private inveetment alternatives. (1) The larger the 
share of output attributable to capital as a factor of production in any 
one of the three sectors, the relatively larger the socially optimum 
capital/output ratio in that sector will tend to be. Hence, small e::pan-
sicns in output will tend to require relatively large investments in capital. 
(2) In the initial periods of the plan the social desirability of marginal 
increments of agricultural goods may be expected to exeed the social desir­
ability of marginal increments of manufactured goods. This would tend to 
enhance the social desirability of investing in agriculture relative to 
manufacturing early in the plan. (3) Whether the relative social desirabil­
ities of marginal increments of production of agricultural and manufactured 
goods remain unchanged over the planning horizon depends on the relative 
rates of increase of consumption of the two goods. If the ratio of 
agricultural goods/manufactured goods consumption declines over time at 
a sufficiently rapid rate, the social desirability of marginal increments 
of agricultural production may increase relative to the social value of an 
increment of manufactured goods production. (4) The social desirability 
of expanding productive capicity in the capital goods sector is enhanced 
relative to expansion of the productive capacity of the other sectors if 
relatively less weight is given to current rather than future consumption 
during the plan. In other words, the lower the social rate of discount 
the greater the social desirability of investing in expansion of the 
capital goods sector. (6) As society's concern to bequeath a large post-
plan productive capacity to future generations increases, the social 
desirability of expanding the productive capacity of the capital goods 
sector during the plan will increase. (7) If the effective rate of SOC 
no 
accumulation in commercial agriculture exceeds the exogenous rate of 
technical change in the manufacturing and capital goods sectors, this 
will tend to increase the social desirability of investing in agriculture 
relative to the investing in the manufacturing or capital goods sectors. 
This, however, may have adverse TT effects. (8) If the TT move in favor 
of a particular sector, this tends to increase the social desirability 
of expanding the productive capacity of that sector via investment. This 
conclusion depends crucially on the assumption of a closed economy. 
The discussions of the allocation of private and public investment 
funds have largely abstracted from the opportunity costs of making these 
investments and the interrelationships between private and public invest­
ment. These problems are considered in the following section. 
Private Investment Versus SOC Accumulation 
The marginal social desirability of investing in either private 
capital or SOC is determined by the potential payoffs involved from such 
investments and the total amount of investment funds available for these 
purposes. The potential payoffs have been extensively analyzed in the 
preceding sections. In this section the availability of funds is 
considered. 
The total funds available for SOC accumulation are the tax revenue 
collected in the particular period. The government budget constraint is 
given in (4.10). The funds available for private capital accumulation are 
the income earned by the existing capital stock plus any funds transferred 
from the government budget. The private savings budget is given in (4.19). 
Ill 
The transfer of funds from the government budget to the private 
savings budget must satisfy the first-order requirements in (4.43). 
These conditions may be rewritten as 
- Xioc) = ° (4.43a) 
These conditions require that the social value of a marginal increment of 
investment in private capital must not exceed the social value of 
a marginal increment in SOG accumulation (X^Q,_)O This relationship is 
maintained by transferring government funds to the private savings 
budget if the social payoff to private investment exceeds the payoff to 
SOG accumulation. Furthermore^ the social value of marginal increments 
in investment in these two alternatives must be equal if it is desirable 
for funds to be transferred from the government to the private budget. 
Suppose that in period t, and are all positive. This 
implies that (4.52) will be satisfied and that the LHS of (4.46a) will 
equal the RHS. In addition, this implies that X Eliminating 
these two variables from (4.46a) and (4.52), we have 
«3 ^ - St \ - "6t 
This equation indicates that the net social marginal benefit per unit of 
purchasing power in investment in private capital in the commercial agri­
cultural sector must equal the net social marginal benefit per unit of 
purchasing power spent on SOG accumulation in the subsistence sector. 
Relaxing the assumption that is positive weakens (4.73) so that the 
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LHS < RHS. 
Turning now to the interpretation of the individual terms in (4.73), 
the first terra on the LHS represents the discounted present marginal 
social value productivity of private capital stocks in commercial agri­
cultural production in subsequent periods of the plan, deflated by the 
price of investment goods in period t. The second term on the LHS of 
(4,73) indicates the social opportunity cost of using investment goods in 
this manner in period t, deflated by the cost of purchasing these goods. 
The first term on the RHS indicates the present social marginal value 
productivity of SOC in subsistence agricultural production in subsequent 
periods of the plan per unit of net government labor cost. The second 
term is the social opportunity cost (per unit of government purchasing 
power) of using labor for SOC accumulation in period t. Finally, the 
last term on the RHS is the marginal social benefit derived from the 
increased consumer income resulting from the employment of labor in SOC 
accumulation. 
The relative importance of the social opportunity cost of using 
capital goods per unit of private savings expended (X and the 
social opportunity cost of using labor per unit of government expenditure 
(Xg^^/{ l-<|^}(j) will be influenced by the capacity of the capital goods 
industry and the size of the labor force. As the capacity of the capital 
goods industry increases relative to the size of the labor force, the 
social opportunity cost of using investment goods will decline relative 
to the social opportunity cost of using labor. This suggests the transfer 
of funds from the government budget to the private savings budget would be 
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relatively more attractive in an economy which has a larger productive 
capacity in the capital goods industry. The opposite, of course, is 
true in an economy which has relatively more labor in proportion to 
capital goods capacity. 
An additional influence tending to diminish the social desirability 
of transferring funds is the social benefit of the consumer income 
generated by the government employing labor for SOC accumulation. This 
results in a higher wage rate for any labor transferred from subsistence 
agriculture to the government payroll, and the magnitude of the increase 
in the wage rate would be expected to be larger as the ratio of labor to 
the resource base of the economy increases. Consequently, transfer of 
funds from the government budget to the private savings budget is less 
likely to occur in economies which have high ratios of labor to resources. 
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CHAPTER Vo M ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF FOREIGN AID 
Foreign aid can take various forms and be put to alternative uses 
by the recipient country. The principal reason for granting aid should 
be to assist the recipient country in its attempts to develop its 
economy, or to provide short-run relief in cases of emergency. All too 
frequently, however, the form of the aid and the conditions under which 
the aid is provided appear to ba largely determined on the basis of what 
will be of the greatest benefit to the donor country. 
In this chapter, the impact of specific commodity aid on the 
recipient economy is analyzed. Since the models in this study do not 
include foreign trade it is not possible to analyze the problems of 
repaying loans. Only outright gifts of specific commodities to the 
government of the recipient countries are considered. Since one of the 
principal forms of commodity aid has been in the form of food, the major 
portion of this chapter is concerned with a comparative statics analysis 
of the effect on the economy of the recipient country of a grant of food 
aid in one time period. Alternative methods of utilizing and distri­
buting the food are also analyzed. Some implications for other forms 
of commodity aid are drawn and some intertemporal considerations on 
development and resource allocation are discussed. 
Three methods of food distribution are considered. The first and 
simplest of these is the case where food is given as a grant to the 
consumers. The second method considered is where the food is used by 
the government as wages in kind in the development of SOC, The third 
and final distribution method considered is che case where the 
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government merely sells this food in. the market and then uses the 
revenue received from this food as though it was indistinguishable from 
tax revenueo 
The economic consequences of these three alternative distribution 
methods are analyzed within the framework of a partial equilibrium model. 
This model is consistent with the models outlined in the preceding 
chapters and its relationship to these models is elucidated. 
Grants of Food to Consumers 
Outright grants to consumers are assumed to be made for humanitarian 
reasons and nothing is required from the recipient consumers in terms of 
payment for this food. This would have the effect of augmenting the 
aggregate consumer budget by an amount equal to the value of the food aid. 
Assuming changes in the output and prices of manufactured and capital goods 
resulting from food aid to have a negligible effect on consumer income, 
we can denote the aggregate budget constraint as 
I = g(P, Yg, Y^) + PA, (5.1) 
where I denotes aggregate consumer income, P denotes the price of agri­
cultural output (food) and A represents the amount of food aid. Since a 
large portion of the total labor force is employed in the agricultural 
sectors, consumer income is considered to be a function of the price and 
level of output (employment) in these sectors. 
Total demand for food is a function of the relative price of food 
and consumer income. Thus we have 
D = f(P, I). (5.2) 
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The total supply of food Is the sum of domestic production and the 
amount of food aid. Thus we have 
S = h(?p L^) + A, (5.3) 
where domestic supply is a function of the price and the amount of 
subsistence employment- For equilibrium it is required that 
D = S. (5.4) 
To determine the effect of varying the amount of food aid, 
differentiate (5.4) with respect to A and we get 
((ip * + p} = + 1- (5.5) 
Assuming that aid depresses the price of agricultural goods (9P/3A < 0), 
it is apparent that the total quantity of food purchased will not increase 
by the amount of the aid since there will be an offsetting decline in 
domestic production. The extent of the decline in domestic production 
will be determined by the responsiveness of farmers to price changes and 
the responsiveness of prices to changes in aid. The latter will involve 
the responsiveness of consumer demand for food to changes in prices and 
the income changes resulting from price changes and grants of food aid. 
Multiplying both sides of (5.4) by P, differentiating with respect 
to A, and collecting terms we get 
(D + PA + P + P + p2 if  = (s + P  ^2 + p. ( 5 , 6 )  
Equation (5.6) indicates whether the total value of food tends to increase 
or decrease when the amount of aid is altered. If the sum of the terms on 
the LHS (or RHS) of the equation is negative, the total value of the food 
consumed tends to decrease as the amount of aid increases. Dividing the 
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LHS of (5.6) by D we get 
« • ' )  
The term % (4r ^) defines the price elasticity of demand for food 
D oP oI oF 
which Mellor suggests is approximately -0.9 for low-income countries (38, 
PA 3? Bp 
p. 72). Since 1 ^ _ 1 and < 0, the term 1; will be negative 
unless Mellor's price elasticity estimate is too low in absolute value. 
PA 
The likelihood that this term is negative will increase as — increases. 
2 ^ p 3f 
The term ^  will be positive unless food is an inferior good. Thusj if 
{ } is positive^ the likelihood that the total value of the food consumed 
tends to decrease as the amount of food aid is increased will tend to be 
larger as the proportion of the food that is provided as aid increases. 
In other words, an increase in the amount of aid is more likely to cause 
the total value of the food consumed to decline as the ratio of food aid 
to domestic production increases. 
The principal net effect of the grants form of food aid distribution 
appears to be the increase in consumer welfare that occurs in the particu­
lar period in which the aid is given. To the extent that this aid is a 
"once in a lifetime" effort and prices of agricultural goods are depressed 
for one period, there could result a misallocation of private investment 
resources under the assumptions of the decentralized model of Chapters II 
and III. It is also conceivable that aid of this nature would reduce the 
social value of marginal agricultural production (IL^ and X ) in the cen­
tralized model in Chapter IV. If that is the case and the government anti­
cipated receiving this food aid^ there would be a reduced incentive to 
invest in agricultural SOC in preceding periods relative to the incentive 
that would exist if no aid was anticipated. 
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If the government planning authority anticipated receiving food aid 
throughout the duration of the planning period and no adjustments were 
made in the objectives of the plan, the resulting terminal capital 
structure may very well be different than if no aid was received or 
anticipated. Underinvestment in agriculture is likely to occur if no 
emphasis is placed on self-sufficiency. 
Food Aid for Work Projects or Wages in Kind 
In this method of food aid distribution, the recipients are 
required to work on projects to earn their food in the form of wages. 
The projects are assumed to be SOC projects and the laborers are drawn 
from the subsistence sector. This has the effect of reducing current 
agricultural production more than in the previously analyzed case where 
the food «CS simply granted without any conditions. 
The amount of labor which can be hired through the use of the food 
as wages in kind is 
(l-Y)(Lg + L^) = PA, (5.8) 
and substituting into (2.12) we get 
- PA/w(l-^). (5.9) 
Thus 3 
= - # - T ll' (5-10) 
and from (5.3) we get 
as = ,3h 
SA ^9P " S 9L ' 9A g BI 
3S _ A 3h 3P _ P ^  
a a r a? / sa r ciT ' 
where Ç = w(l-Y). Since 9h/3L > 0 by assumption, the magnitude 
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(5,11) must be less than the value of the R.HS of (5.5). Consequently^ 
the magnitude of the decrease in price resulting from this type of 
distribution must ba less than the decrease due to a simple grant in 
food since the demand side of (5.5) remains unchanged. In other words? 
the intraperiod pr?';e effect of this type of food and distribution is 
smaller than if the food is simply given as a grant because domestic 
production will fall to a greater extent as a result of the labor trans­
ferring out of the subsistence sector. The net result is that there is a 
relatively smaller payoff within the period when food is used to employ 
labor on SOC work projects because consumption does not increase as much 
as in the case of grants. In succeeding periods, however, tnere will be 
some additional social payoff from the increased production possible 
because of the added SOC available for productive purposes. 
Market Sales of Food 
The third distribution method to be considered is the case where the 
government in the recipient country se!Is the food in the open market and 
simply adds the revenue from the sale of this food to the general govern­
ment budget. The centralized model discussed in Chapter IV considers two 
alternative uses for this additional government revenue. The additional 
revenue can be used to employ labor for SOC accumulation or to purchase 
capital goods for investment in private capital accumulation. The first 
of these two alternatives is identical with the wages in kind distribu­
tion method considered in the preceding section. 
The intraperiod consequences of using the revenue generated by food 
sales to purchase capital goods are more complex. The increased demand 
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fer capital goods will tend to result in a higher price for capital goods, 
This will result in expanded production in this sector and a subsequent 
withdrawal of labor from the subsistence sector. Thus? (5.9) is replaced 
by 
- 2^ - 3^ - - ^ 1' 
where and L. may be zero. Differentiating (5.12) with respect to aid 
we get 
9ij SL « 3P, 
iri ' - igr i-f < 0- (5.13) 
The absolute magnitude of (5.13) may be expected to be less than the 
absolute magnitude of (5.10) since the revenue earned from food sales 
must also cover expenses such as additional manufactured inputs in 
addition to hiring more labor. Differentiating (5.3) under these 
assumptions we get 
JS , Ai !!l . JUi i „ 14, 
aA 8P. a A BL a A - " -
1 s 3 
The demand side of the system also requires some modification since 
aggregate consumer income is no longer augmented by the value of the food 
aid. The additional food must be purchased out of the income earned in 
other employment. Thus, equation (5.1) is replaced by 
I = g(P^, Pg), (5.15) 
where P^ is included since output and production in the capital goods 
sector must be considered. Differentiating (5.2) with respect to food 
aid we get 
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iD = i_f f:!.. if (5 16) 
3A 3P^ 3 A 31 SA 3?^ aA^" 13.-o; 
oh '^""s 
Comoaring (5.14) with the RHS of (5.5); since —r- r > 0^ 
3^  32\ 3A 
s J 
it is apparent that for any given change in ? resulting from aid, the 
change in the quantity produced domestically plus Luù amount of aid will 
be ' r'r^er if the aid is distributed in the form of grant;, rather than sold 
in the market and the revenue used to purchase capital goods» This result 
follows since the purchase of capital goods will "vnd to cause an expansion 
of capital goods production which will draw labor out of the subsistence 
sector causing a leftward shift in the domestic supply curve. Making a 
similar comparison between (5.16) and the LHS of (5.5). the change in the 
quantity consumed when the food is distributed as a grant will be larger 
than when it is sold in the market. The reason for this disparity is 
that when the food is given as a grant, effective Aggregate consumer 
income increases by the amount of the value of the food aid resulting in 
a rightward shift in the demand curve. Sel^'kiig the additional food 
through the market results in a smaller inco,;:-,c effect and, hence, a 
smaller rightward shift in the demand curve. The net implication of 
these two sets of relative changes is t'lat th.,-. quantity of food consumed 
will increase more when the aid is distributed in the form of grants 
• ,-ither than when the aid is sold in the market and the revenue generated 
by these sales used to purchase capital goods. The relative influence of 
the two distribution methods on the price of food y; 111 depend on the 
relative magnitudes of the demand and supply shifts. 
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Comparisons Among the Three Distribution Alternatives 
The intraperiod relationships among the prices and quantities of 
agricultural goods under the three distribution methods may be compared 
diagranmatically as in Figure 5.1. The demand and supply curves that 
would prevail in the absence of aid are represented by the curves and 
S , respectively. These demand and supply schedules would result in a 
price of and quantity consumed of Q . 
Distributing the food aid in the form of grants results in the 
largest shift in the supply curve since employment in the subsistence 
sector remains unchanged. Thus, S = S + A, where S represents the 
go g 
total supply curve and represents the domestic supply curve that 
prevails if no aid is given. Since granting the food to consumers has 
the effect of bolstering aggregate effective consumer income, the demand 
schedule shifts to the right and is represented by the curve D^. The 
intersection of the resulting demand and supply curves results in a 
price-quantity configuration where and 0^ < The equilibrium 
price under grants of aid must be lower than ujider no aid unless the 
marginal propensity to consume food out of income is unity. In other 
words, if the recipients of the grants of aid divert some of the income 
they were previously spending on food to the consumption of nonfood 
commodities, a drop in price will result. 
Turning now to the work projects form of distribution, the income 
effect of this form of distribution is identical with the income effect 
of grants and D = D . The domestic supply curve will shift to the left 
w g 
since labor is transferred from the subsistence sector to SOC projects, 
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Q, D, S 
o 
Figure 5=1= Prices and quantities of food consumed under alternative 
distribution methods 
but the shift will not be sufficient to offset the influence of the aid 
9 4  
by virtue of the assumptions embodied in (2,21)„ Consequently, the 
equilibrium quantity consumed will increase and be greater than the 
quantity that would be consumed in the absence of aid. However, the 
^^ From (2.6), (2.21) and (5.9), we get GAFOlia2-l(2) > _i, 
d  A  6  S  S  S  S  ^  
ThuSj the leftward shift of the domestic supply curve is not sufficient to 
offset the rightward shift of the total supply curve by the aid, = 1. 
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increase in quantity consumed will not be as large as the increase 
realized when the food is given to consumers ir, the form of grants. This 
leads to an equilibrium price-quantity relationship and Q which has 
the characteristics that P > P > P and 0 < 0 < Q . 
o w g 'o g 
Distributing the food aid through sales in the market place and using 
the revenue from these sales to hire subsistence labor to work on SOC 
projects affects the economy in exactly the saae manner as if the food was 
distributed as wages in kind since the revenue earned from the sales is 
all paid out in wages. Thus, the effect on consumer income is the same 
as in the wages in kind distribution and exactly the same amount of labor 
can be hired from the subsistence sector leading to identical demand and 
supply shifts. However, if the revenue from government food sales is 
used to purchase capital goods, the domestic supply schedule for agricul­
tural goods will shift to the left by a smaller amount than in the case of 
wages in kind distribution, as is evident from comparing (5.14) and the 
RHS of (5.5)= The demand curve does not shift as much since all the 
additional food must be purchased out of income earned in employment„ 
Thus, income is augmented only to the extent that the increased purchase 
of capital goods bids up the price of capital and hence, leads to 
increased employment in the capital goods industry where the return to 
labor is higher than in the subsistence sector. This income effect is 
smaller than that experienced with the grants or wages in kind distribu­
tion methods. Hence D must lie between D and D . For exactly the same 
s 0 w 
9 5  
reason, the new supply schedule S must lie between S and S . The 
s w g 
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The amount of labor removed from subsistence production is smaller 
if capital goods are purchased than if SOC projects are undertaken. 
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resulting equilibrium price, and quantity, Q , have the properties 
that P > P > P and 0 < Q < Q . The equilibrium magnitude of P 
O W S O  S g  -  °  s  
relative to P and Q relative to Q will depend on the extent of the 
g s ^ 
shifts in the supply and demand schedules. It must be pointed out that 
these orderings may change if the labor hired in each of these situations 
does not come from the subsistence agricultural sector and is hired from 
an urban or rural pool of unemployed workers„ 
In summary, distributing the food through outright grants to con­
sumers results in the largest increase in consumption and^ hence, in 
consumer welfare. However, distributing food in this manner tends to 
depress the price of agricultural commodities more than if the food is 
used for work projects. It is not clear whether selling the food to 
consumers or giving it in the form of grants depresses the price of food 
the most. Although giving the food to consumers as an outright gift for 
purely humanitarian purposes has the largest welfare effect within the 
period, the benefits derived from this form of aid are limited to the 
time during which the aid is being received. The other distribution 
methods analyzed all have a smaller immediate impact on welfare. However, 
since these other alternatives created resources that were used to e::pand 
capacity, some of the payoff from these methods of utilizing food aid is 
not forthcoming until the increased consumption possibilities are realized 
in later periods. 
Based on the assumptions underlying this study, the use of food aid 
has a tendency to depress the price of agricultural goods regardless of 
the method of distribution. Similarly, food aid will tend to reduce the 
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social value of a marginal increment of agricultural expansion. If a 
country was assured of receiving a certain amount of food aid for several 
periods and the government anticipated this aid in formulating its 
development plan, the incentive to expand the productive capacity of the 
agricultural sectors would be somewhat less than if no food aid was 
anticipated. If the food aid terminated unexpectedlyj the economy would 
probably have a somewhat different capital structure than if the termina­
tion of aid was foreseen. This suggests that if an economy begins to rely 
on and to expect food aid, the economic incentives to develop the agricul­
tural sectors are reduced. One way to insure that some development of 
these sectors does occur is to stipulate that the food must be used on 
work projects designed to assist in the development of agriculture. For 
example, the food could be used to develop an irrigation system or a 
rural road system to facilitate the marketing of produce. 
Some Comments on Commodity Aid in General 
Many of the effects emanating from food aid discussed in the preceding 
section appear to apply to any type of commodity aid which can be consumed 
directly. In terms of the models of this study, granting manufactured 
goods as aid would tend to move the terms of trade against that sector. 
Another result that appears to generalize to include manufactured goods 
aid is that as long as a country is receiving this type of aid and expects 
to continue receiving it, there will be a reduced incentive to develop 
that sector. This is because the social payoff to expanding the produc­
tive capacity is reduced since the commodity aid serves as a substitute 
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for domestic productive capacity. 
If capital goods are provided as commodity aid the results are 
somewhat more abstruse since the demand for capital goods is a derived 
demand. However, it appears that the same phenomena apply in this case 
even though the goods are not consumed directly. The difficulty in the 
analysis of capital goods aid arises, in part, from the lags in the pay­
off. If the capital goods are placed in the capital goods industry, there 
can be no direct social payoff for at least two periods. If the capital 
goods are placed in a sector producing consumption goods, the payoff is 
forthcoming in the subsequent period in the form of expanded consumer 
goods production. To reap the payoff from capacity expansion in the 
capital goods sector results in an additional waiting period relative to 
placing the capital in the consumer goods sectors. Furthermore, it seems 
that capital goods aid will tend to reduce the social need and, hence, the 
incentive to develop this industry. 
In summary, it appears that granting extended commodity aid of any 
particular type tends to reduce the incentive to develop that particular 
sector. This result ensues because the aid serves as a substitute for 
domestic productive capacity and, therefore, tends to bias the resource 
allocation criteria against the development of that sector. If the fore­
going hypothesis is true, this can be at least partly remedied by placing 
restrictions on the purposes for which the recipient country may use the 
commodity aid. For example, in the case of food aid the donor country 
may require the food to be used in work projects which will help expand 
the productive capacity of agriculture. If capital goods are provided 
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as aid. the stipulation may be that these goods must be used to develop 
the capital goods industry. However, stipulations such as these will 
be good policy only if a measure of self-sufficiency in the production 
of the commodity is desirable. 
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CHAPTER VI. EMPLOYMENT, LABOR SUPPLY, AMD POPULATION GROWTH 
At the outset of this study, some rather restrictive assumptions 
were made regarding the size of the labor force, wage rates, and 
employment. In particular, the total labor supply was assumed to be 
fixed and perfectly inelastic. The wage rate was assumed to be exoge-
nously determined at a constant level in the commercial agricultural, 
capital goods, manufacturing goods, and government sectors. Combining 
this constant wage rate assumption with the assumption that the total 
labor supply is perfectly inelastic implies that employment in the 
subsistence sector is determined by the interaction of the residual 
supply of labor and demand for labor in the subsistence sector. The 
implications of these assumptions are examined in the next section. 
This is followed by an analysis of the consequences of relaxing some of 
these assumptions. 
Employment with Fixed Wage Rates and Inelastic Labor Supply 
Any demand for labor in this study is a derived demand since direct 
demands for labor services are not considered. Thus, the demand schedule 
for labor in the subsistence and commercial agricultural sectors, manu­
facturing goods sector, and capital goods sector correspond to marginal 
value of productivity curves in these sectors. These curves can be 
derived from the resource allocation equations in the manner discussed 
in Chapter II, For example, (4.5), (4.14), and (4.16) can be solved to 
obtain the demand for labor in period t in the capital goods sector as 
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where denotes the wage rate, 
°3 ^  (6«2) 
and 
A  =  Y  , ^  ,  •  >  1  (6.3) 
1-6 l-S, 
Thus, demand for labor in the capital goods sector in period t is a 
function of the wage rate, price of output, level of capital stock, and 
level of technology. The demand equation has constant elasticity with 
respect to the wage rate equal to A(6.-1) < 0. Thus, the demand for labor 
will never fall to zero even at very high wage rates. Conversely, the 
wage rate will never fall to zero even if the amount of labor offered for 
employment is extremely large. 
Similar demand equations for labor can be derived for the commercial 
agricultural and manufacturing goods sectors. Adding the demands for 
labor for these two sectors to the labor demand in the capital goods 
sectors leads to an aggregate demand function of the form 
\ "it-
where -l- = (K^^, K_^), and T represents the 
state of technical productivity in the manufacturing and capital goods 
sectors. This demand is referred to as the labor demand in the advanced 
secte The form of (6.4) suggests a common wage rate, exists in 
all three advanced sectors. 
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Two alternative sources of employment for labor exist in addition 
to the employment opportunities in the advanced sectors. These alterna­
tives are employment in the government sector, 
\ ' ht ht' 
and employment in the subsistence sector. Assume^ for the moment, that 
government employment is exogenously determined and given. Since the 
wage rate in the advanced sectors is assumed to be fixed, (6.4) determines 
a quantity of labor demanded for employment in these sectors. Thus, since 
the total labor supply is also fixed, employment in the subsistence sector 
is determined as a residual 
L = L - L - L o (6.6) 
st o t t 
The marginal value productivity of employing the last unit of labor 
in the subsistence sector determines the wage rate earned in that sector. 
Although there are not sufficient equations in the model to derive the 
MP equation directly^ such a function does exist and, in fact, fulfills 
a role in subsistence wage determination analogous to a labor demand 
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function. Denote this function as 
"st ° s (fit- %t' (G-?) 
It can be readily demonstrated that this function has properties similar 
to those exhibited by equation (6,4) with respect to the quantity of labor 
employed and the wage rate. 
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In addition to the income earned by labor, it was assumed that 
labor also receives the rent earned by land in the subsistence sector 
as exemplified by (2.20) and (2.21). This unearned component of subsis­
tence labor income is ignored for the moment. 
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The employment-wage determination problems can be illustrated 
GiûgecîEnaûically as in Figure 6.1, for simplicity, the functions in 
(6.4) and (6.7) are assumed to be linear with respect to wage rates and 
employment. The quantity of labor is represented along the horizontal 
axis. The left vertical axis indicates the wage rate in the advanced 
sectors and the right vertical axis measures the subsistence wage rate. 
Employment in the advanced sectors is measured from left to right and 
subsistence employment is measured from right to left. Assuming an 







Figure 6.1. Employment and wage determination with a fixed labor force 
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labor demand of L^, if government employment on SOC projects requires 
a quantity of labor equal to subsistence employment (measured from 
right to left) results in a wage rate of Reducing government employ­
ment to zero would leave employment and the wage rate in the advanced 
sectors unchanged, but employment in the subsistence sector would increase 
to L ^  and the subsistence wage rate would fall to I'J . = This would result 
si si 
in a reduction of the total wage bill and, hence, consumer income for the 
economy. 
The rigidity of the wage rate in the advanced sectors may be the 
result of any one or more of several reasons. For example, subsistence 
laborers may be unwilling to leave their village to work in the advanced 
sectors for a wage rate any lower than w. Employees in the advanced 
sectors may be organized in a labor union which demands that the union 
members be paid this wage rate and restrict membership and employment 
accordingly. Another reason may be that the average subsistence laborer 
may not be sufficiently well trained to be employed in the advanced 
sectors. Thus the employers may have to make some sort of investment in 
the individuals. Once this investment in training has been made, the 
advanced sector employees are differentiated from the labor employed in 
the subsistence sector. 
Government employees are assumed to receive the same wage rate 
as employees in the advanced sectors. 
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The Implications of an Elastic Supply of Labor 
Assuming the total supply of labor is perfectly inelastic with 
respect to the wage rate implies that the aggregate income-leisure 
preferences of the individuals in the labor force have certain peculiar 
characteristics. It is more common to assume that the amount of labor 
offered for employment increases at higher wage rates. Thus 3 as the 
subsistence wage rate increases the size of the effective labor force also 
increases. This tends to offset the amount of the increase in the 
subsistence wage rate resulting from, for example, an expansion in govern­
ment employment. 
This offsetting effect is illustrated in Figure 6.2. The subsistence 
and advanced sector wage rates are both measured on the left vertical 
axis. The horizontal axis represents labor. Employment in the advanced 
^\/ — 
and government sectors (L and L) are measured from the left. The total 
supply of labor is represented by the curve 
= f(Wg, t) (6.8) 
Assuming the wage rate in the advanced sectors is exogenously fixed 
at ÙJ implies that the quantity of labor employed in these sectors equals 
L^. If government employment is fixed at then the demand for labor 
in the subsistence sector, is measured to the right of the point, 
A . The intersection of the W curve with the S_ curve indicates an 
O OS li 
equilibrium subsistence wage rate of and employment of If 
government employment was increased from to this would have the 





Figure 6.2. Wage rates and eiuployiaent with an elastic labor supply 
measured. This origin would shift from A to A,. The new subsistence 
o 1 
sector labor demand curve would also shift to the right and be represented 
by the broken line, The intersection of this curve with the supply 
curve would result in an equilibrium subsistence wage rate of W , and 
employment of This new wage rate is lower than the wage rate (W' ) 
that would exist if the supply of labor was completely inelastic at the 
quantity L^. With an elastic labor supply, equilibrium employment in the 
subsistence section (I, would also be larger than employment if the 
total labor supply was inelastic (L'). 
Employment and Wage Rates Through Time 
In this section, the supply of labor is assumed to be perfectly 
inelastic since this simplifies the analysis and does not substantially 
affect the conclusions « The implications of relaxing this assumption are 
briefly discussed at the end of the section. 
The effects of technical change and capital accumulation 
If all prices and the wage rate in the advanced sectors are assumed 
remain constant over time, the demand for labor in the manufacturing and 
capital goods sector will increase over time because of the exogenous 
increase in productivity. For example, if the rate of technical progress 
is assumed to be lOOe percent per year in the absence of investment in 
the capital goods sector, the rate of increase in the demand for labor 
can be derived from equation (6.1) as 
(St - = a-i-o' - i> ^  (6.9) 
The rate of growth of labor demand exceeds the rate of technical change 
since A >1 as defined in (6.3). Since the labor demand equation for the 
manufacturing sector is of identical form, the rate of growth of labor 
demand due to technical change in the manufacturing goods sector is 
St 
where T = 1/(1 - y^ - Y 2)• Technical change in the commercial agricul­
tural sector is assumed to be a function of the rate of SOC accumulation 
in this sector. Hence, labor demand in this sector will increase when­
ever investment in SOC takes place. 
Turning next to private investment., labor demand in each of the 
advanced sectors is positively related to the stock of private capital. 
Thus3 private investment in any of these sectors tends to increase the 
demand for labor in the advanced sectors. 
Increases in the demand for labor over time in the advanced sectors 
are illustrated in Figure 6,3 by the labor demand schedule. L, shifting 
to the right. The accumulation of subsistence sector SOC results in an 
increase in the marginal value productivity of labor in that sector. 
This effect is reflected through an upward shift in the IW? schedule, 
W 5 in Figure 6.3. These shifts are discussed in the following section. 
The effects of population growth 
One of the major problems facing less-developed countries today is 
the extremely high rate of population growth. In the preceding sections, 
the assumption that the total labor supply remains constant over time 
implicitly suggests that population also remains constant over time. The 
implications of relaxing these very restrictive assumptions of constant 
labor force and population are investigated in this section. 
Two alternative assumptions regarding labor and population growth 
are investigated. The first of these is to assume that population grows 
at an exogenously specified constant percentage rate. The second 
alternative is to assume that the rate of population growth is a function 
of the level of per capita income in the subsistence sector. 
Constant population pirowth Assume that total population, N, 
grows at a constant percentage rate 1. Thus, 
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(6 .11)  
where N indicates the population in the initial period. If it is 
further assumed that a constant portion of the population, actively 
participates in the labor force, then and the labor force grows 
at the same rate as the population. 
The implications of combining this assumption with the results dis­
cussed in the preceding section are illustrated in Figure 6.3. For 
simplicity government employment is ignored. An equivalent assumption 
would be to assume that government employment remained constant. 
vL 
so 
Figure 6.3. Wage rates and employment over time 
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The structure of Figure 6.3 is the same as that of Figure 6.1. As 
a result of the assumed increase in the labor force between the two 
periods, the total (perfectly inelastic) labor supply is shifted to the 
right by the amount nL^. Thus, the origin for the subsistence labor IW? 
curve is also shifted to the right. As a consequence of technical change 
and capital accumulation in the advanced sectors, the demand for labor in 
these sectors shifts to the right from L to L . This leads to an increase 
in employment in the advanced sectors even though the wage rate is assumed 
to remain unchanged. If SOC investment occurs in the subsistence sector 
in the initial period, the M\n? curve will shift upwards„ As drawn in 
Figure 6.3, thi_ upward shift of the schedule is not sufficient to 
offset the rightward shift of the origin resulting from the growth in 
the population and labor force. 
The net results of the shifts illustrated in Figure 6.3 are that 
employment in both the subsistence and advanced sectors increase. However, 
in spite of productivity increases and capital accumulation in both the 
subsistence and advanced sectors, the increase in population was so large 
that the wage rate in the subsistence sector was actually lower in the 
second period than in the first. Of course, this need not be the out­
come. A larger productivity increase or smaller population growth could 
result in an increase in the wage rate in the subsistence sector. 
Population growth as a function of the subsistence wage rate If 
tiie subsistence wage rate in the initial period in Figure 6.3 is the 
minimum on which the laborers can survive, this will impose a lower limit 
on the wage rate in this sector. This lower limit will be enforced by 
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preventing population growth from being maintained at the constant per­
centage rate n. Thus, the minimum survival wage rate places a biological 
ceiling on the rate of population growth and the right hand side origin in 
Figure 6.3 will exhibit a smaller rightward shift. 
If the economy is in a situation such as this, economic development 
becomes extremely difficult» Any small increase in developmental effort 
is offset by an increase in the rate of population growth. To break out 
of this dilemma requires an effort of major proportions since productivity 
increases must be attained which will be of sufficient magnitude to allow 
the subsistence wage rates to increase in spite of the increases in 
population. 
If the assumption of a perfectly inelastic labor supply is relaxed, 
the consequences of population growth remain essentially unaltered if 
the supply curve is merely assumed to shift to the right. If the rate 
of population growth is assumed to be a function of the subsistence wage 
rate, then the rate of shift of the labor supply curve is also a function 
of the wage rate. If this shift of the labor supply curve is sufficiently 
large to prevent the wage rate from rising, or if the maximum shift 
possible is dictated by starvation resulting from the low wage rate in. 
the subsistence sector, a low-level equilibrium trap exists» 
Food aid and population growth If an economy is in a situation 
such that the rate of population growth is restrained by the income 
levels in the subsistence sector, the introduction of food aid may 
98 
It is considerations such as the above which have led to a 
proliferation of low-level equilibrium traps. See, for example, 
Leibensteiu (31) and Jorgenson (23). 
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result in an increase in the rate of population growth. Particularly 
if the aid is given in the form of grants to consumers, the economy would 
appear to become even more dependent on foreign aid since the grants form 
of aid does not stimulate productivity increases. Thus, the aid would 
result in an increase in population which will not be sustainable upon 
termination of this aid. Food aid distributed in the form of work 
projects would also lead to a similar population increase, but this form 
of aid would re ''It in some offsetting productivity increases. 
Market sales distribution of aid would not lead to increases in 
population growth like grants or work projects distribution. As discussed 
in Chapter V, market sales tend to depress the marker price for agricul­
tural goods resulting in a reduction of the wage rate earned in the 
subsistence sector. This may result in a restriction of the rate of 
population growth. 
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CHAPTER VII. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS 
This study was undertaken to investigate the intersectoral relation­
ships between the agricultural and nonagricultural sectors in a less-
developed economy. The framework of analysis is a theoretical^ five-
sector, general-equilibrium model of a dualistic economy. The model 
includes intracountry trade in labor, capital goods and manufactured 
inputs as factors of production. Agricultural goods and manufactured 
consumer goods are traded as final products. Capital goods and labor 
(services) are not consumed. 
Intercountry trade is not considered. Many of the conclusions of 
this study appear to depend crucially on this assumption of no foreign 
trade. Studying the development of an economy without considering the 
prospects of foreign trade tends to lead to policy conclusions based on 
an implicit value judgment which is frequently overlooked. Specifically, 
the policy recommendatinns often implicitly assume that self-sufficiency 
is desirable. In a closed-economy model, a shift in the terms of trade 
in favor of sector A at the expense of sector B is frequently interpreted 
as a signal to transfer resources to A from B thereby expanding the 
productive capacity in A relative to B. If international trade is 
considered as a possibility, the correct policy prescription may be quite 
different. For example, if the price of good B fell below the world 
market price while that of good A rose above the world market price, the 
best policy might be to export good B and use the foreign exchange 
earnings to import good A. 
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With this brief but important qualification, the following 
conclusions are enumerated as a result of this investigation. 
Public Investment in Subsistence Agriculture 
In an economy with a given resource base., capital stock, level of 
technology, and wage-price configuration, the proportion of the labor 
force engaged in subsistence employment will increase -is the size of the 
labor force increases. This is because for a given level of wages and 
prices and a fixed productive capacity, only a limited number of jobs are 
available in advanced sectors. Thus, as the ratio of labor to resource 
base increases, the proportion of the labor force in the subsistence 
sector also increases. It was demonstrated in the preceding chapters 
that as the proportion of the labor force employed in subsistence agri­
culture increases it becomes relatively more important to increase the 
productivity of subsistence agriculture. There is no a priori reason to 
suggest that there should not be a net inflow of savings into the 
subsistence sector if the proportion of the labor force employed in this 
sector is large enough. Conversely, there is no reason co suggest that 
the subsistence agricultural sector should not be used as a source of 
savings to finance nonagricultural development in an economy with a 
different resource endowment, labor force distribution, and capital 
structure. Whether or not there should be a net inflow of savings into 
subsistence agriculture will depend on the individual country concerned 
and the relevant data and parameters pertaining to that country. However, 
the following characteristics may be itemized as relevant to the decision 
regarding investment in the subsistence sector. 
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The first and most obvious consideration is the physical productivity 
of the investment project» Ceteris paribus, the physically more produc­
tive an investment project, the greater is the likelihood that ic will be a 
desirable undertaking. The productivity of a particular investment may 
depend crucially on one or more related investments. For example, an 
extension program extolling the virtues of a new crop variety may have an 
extremely payoff if the necessary complementary fertilizer is not 
available. If the appropriate investment in providing fertilizer is also 
made; the same extension program may have a very high payoff. Considera­
tions such as these have led to advocating what has aptly been called the 
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package approach for agricultural development. 
The physical productivity of an investment project is not the only 
consideration in investment decisions. Productivity must be weighted by 
an appropriate value which is placed on the output. In this study, the 
social value of the output was used as the weighting factor in the decision 
criteria for allocating government funds in both the centralized and 
decentralized models, and in the allocation of private savings in the 
centralized model. However, prices were used to value the output in 
decisions regarding the allocation of private savings in the decentralized 
model. It was demonstrated for a closed economy with a given level of 
consumer income that both the social value and price of agricultural 
relative to nonagricultural output would increase as the ratio of the 
consumption of agricultural goods to manufactured goods declined. It 
was also argued that this result would not necessarily hold if the decline 
___ -
Johnson (20). These types of externalities have not been discussed 
in this study. 
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in the ratio of agricultural/nonagricultural goods consumption \-ias 
accompanied by an increase in real income. Then the TT and social valua­
tions would move in favor of the agricultural sector only if the rate of 
decline in the consumption ratio was sufficient to offset the influence 
of Engel's law at higher income levels. This suggests that as the 
economy achieves higher levels of output in both agricultural and non-
agricultural production, investment in agriculture might become relatively 
less desirable than at lower levels of output. This statement does not 
mean that it will not be desirable to invest in agriculture at higher 
income levels; nor does it mean that it is desirable to invest in agricul­
ture at" low income levels. 
It was assumed that public investment in the subsistence sector 
involves employing labor at a higher wage rate than the labor was pre­
viously earning in the subsistence sector. If this is true, the social 
desirability of investing in the subsistence sector tends to increase as 
the disparity between the government wage rate and the subsistence wage 
rate increases. This conclusion involves the implicit assumption that the 
marginal utility of income diminishes as income increases, 
The foregoing factors all affect the social benefit to be derived 
from an investment in subsistence agriculture. Whether this investment 
should be carried out depends on the size of the anticipated social benefit 
relative to the s00 r;oortunity cost of using the resources in this 
manner. This shoulJ. -lOL be confused with the criterion used in simple 
cost-benefit analysis where actual costs are compared .with anticipated 
^^'^This assumption is implicit in the welfare function postulated in 
this < tudy. 
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returns. Actual costs of a project may differ substantially from the 
opportunity costs of using the resources in this manner. Opportunity 
costs of resources take into consideration the possible payoffs that 
could be realized by these resources in all possible alternatives.^^" 
The foregoing conclusions were obtained from the analysis of the 
decentralized economy model. Similar results could have been derived from 
the centralized model. The following results were obtained from the 
analysis of the centralized model. 
Investment in Subsistence Versus Commercial Agriculture 
In this section factors affecting the relative merits of investing in 
infrastructure in either subsistence or commercial agriculture are dis­
cussed, Throughout this investigation it is assumed that investment in 
social overhead capital in subsistence agriculture would have no produc­
tivity influences on the commercial agricultural sector and vice versa. 
This is a fairly realistic assumption for some forms of investment„ For 
example, an irrigation system may be built to provide water for either 
subsistence producers or commercial producers. For some other forms of 
investment, this is clearly an unrealistic assumption. For example, a 
road may be built which is used by both subsistence and commercial 
producers. The following conclusions are derived with the assumption that 
there is no complementarity between sectors in investment in social over­
head capital, 
^^^In a perfectly competitive market with flexible wages and prices 
and factor mobility, the opportunity costs of resources will equal their 
actual costs. 
147 
Ceteris paribus, as the ratio of labor employed in subsistence 
agriculture to labor employed in commercial agriculture increases, invest­
ment in forms of social overhead capital specific to the subsistence 
sector becomes relatively more desirable. Similarly, the larger the 
proportion of the cultivated area that is being used in subsistence 
agriculture, the more desirable the investment in this sector becomes 
relative to investment in commercial agriculture. 
The characteristic that has been used to differentiate subsistence 
from commercial agriculture is that commercial producers are assumed to 
use fixed, reproducible capital as a factor of production while subsis­
tence producers do not. As the commercial producers accumulate more fixed 
capital, the social desirability of investing in social overhead capital 
in commercial agriculture increases relative to investing in the subsis­
tence sector. 
Investing in either commercial or subsistence sector social overhead 
capital in any one period tends to reduce the relative social desirability 
of investing in that sector in the subsequent periodso To the extent that 
the increased output resulting from public investment in either of these 
sectors tends to reduce the relative social value of agricultural produc­
tion, investing in the subsistence sector in any one period will also tend 
to reduce the desirability of investing in commercial agriculture in sub­
sequent periods. 
The discussion of the foregoing conclusions abstracts from the 
considerations of the opportunity costs of investing in social overhead 
capital in agriculture. These opportunity costs arise from the alternative 
investment possibilities for government savings. The alternative con­
sidered in this study is to invest in private capital accumulation in 
the commercial agricultural and nonagricultural sectors » Conclusions 
regarding private capital accumulation are discussed in the next section. 
Private Capital Accumulation 
The conclusions in this section have been derived from the central­
ized model. Two interpretations cf this model are possible. The first 
interpretation is that the government owns all of the reproducible capital 
stock and rents it to entrepreneurs. The rent collected is used to 
accumulate more capital. The second interpretation is that the capital 
is privately owned and the income earned by the capital-owners is used to 
accumulate more capital according to guidelines determined by the central 
planning authorities. Regardless of the interpretation, i-heae savings 
are referred to as private savings (as compared to public savings out of 
taxes) and are allocated among investment alternatives in a manner that 
is consistent with maximizing welfare over the planning horizon. 
The allocation of investment funds between the expansion of capacity 
in capital goods and consumer goods industries involves a difficult inter­
temporal comparison between satisfaction to be derived from expanded 
present versus future consumption. Placement of capital goods in the 
capital goods industry requires an additional period of waiting as compared 
with placing these capital goods in the agricultural or manufacturing 
goods sectors. Higher rates of future consumption require sacrifice of 
current consumption. Thus, expansion of the capital goods industry is 
more apt to be desirable from society's standpoint if the people are not 
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too impatient. That is^ in countries where there are pressures for 
immediate improvements in the living standards of the people there will 
be reduced emphasis on expansion of the capital goods sector. Conversely^ 
when relatively greater emphasis is placed on longer-run improvements in 
livino standards, there will be greater social payoff to increasing 
capacity in the capital goods industry. 
If the productivity in one particular sector increases more rapidly 
than in other sectors, this tends to increase the social desirability of 
investing in that sector provided there are no adverse terms of trade 
effects. This will be true whether the productivity increases arise from 
investments in infrastructure or through the adoption of new techniques 
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developed in advanced countries. 
It was demonstrated for a closed economy that a movement of the 
terms of trade in favor of a particular sector indicated an expansion of 
productive capacity in that sector may be socially desirable. However, as 
indicated at the beginning of this chapter, if foreign trade is considered 
this may be a signal that the particular commodity should be imported if 
sufficient foreign exchange is available. 
In comparing the accumulation of labor intensive social overhead 
capital with the accumulation of private capital, it was argued that 
private capital accumulation as a means of expanding productive capacity 
is relatively more attractive when a relatively larger capacity to produce 
capital goods exists. Conversely, labor intensive social overhead capital 
__ 
This corresponds to the exogenous improvement of productivity 
through disembodied technical change which was assumed to occur in the 
manufacturing and capital goods industries. 
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becomes relatively more attractive as the ratio of the labor force to 
capital goods capacity increases. The reason for this is that as the 
size of the labor force or capital goods capacity increases, the social 
opportunity cost of using these resources tends to decrease. 
The Impact of Food and Other Commodity Aid 
Three alternative methods distributing food aid are compared in this 
study. These methods are outright grants of food to consumers, the distri­
bution of food aid as wages in kind to labor employed on government work 
projects, and government food sales at the market price. All three dis­
tribution methods have a tendency to depress the price of food while the 
quantity of food consumed increases. Assuming domestic production is 
price responsive, all three forms of food aid distribution result in a 
decline in domestic production. More specifically, distributing food as 
grants to consumers resulted in the largest increase in food consumption 
while using food for work projects tended to depress food priccc the 
least. It is impossible to determine a priori whether government market 
sales of food aid or grants to the consumers would depress prices the 
most. Similarly, it is impossible to determine a priori whether distribu­
tion as wages in kind for work projects or as market sales would result in 
the smallest increase in food consumption. 
The effects of food aid on the terms of trade tends to reduce the 
desirability of expanding the productive capacity of agriculture. Distri­
buting food aid in the form of grants would have the largest impact on 
consumer welfare within the period. However, once the grants of food aid 
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are terminated, there would not be any more benefit forthcoming. Food 
aid used for work projects or government market sales will have the effect 
of redistributing resources so that the government has a larger claim. 
These resources can be used to increase the productive capacity of tlie 
economy resulting in additional, benefits in future periods. Using the 
food aid for work projects to increase the productive capacity in the 
agricultural sector would tend to offset tlie reduction in incentives to 
develop agriculture which emanate from the food aid. 
Similar conclusions apply to any directly-consumable commodity aid. 
The implications are less obvious for commodity aid which is not consumed 
directly. However, granting any type of commodity aid appears to reduce 
the incentive to develop that particular sector since the aid serves as 
a substitute for domestic productive capacity. If a measure of self-
sufficiency in the production of the commodity in question considered 
to be desirable, this can be offset by using the aid to mobilize resources 
to develop that particular sector. 
population Growth and Economic Development 
Througiiout most of this study, the supply of labor is assumed to be 
fixed and perfectly inelastic with respect to the wage rate. It is 
demonstrated that relaxing the latter assumption lias essentially no 
effect on the conclusions of the study, although the magnitudes of the 
impacts of some policies may be dampened. For example, an expansion of 
government employment would have a smaller impact on the incomes of 
laborers employed in the subsistence sector if the labor supply curve 
was assumed to be elastic rather than perfectly inelastic. 
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The effects of population, growth depend on the magnitude of the 
rate of population growth relative to the size and rate of growth of the 
capital stock and the rate of technological improvement. If the rate of 
population growth is too high relative to these other factors^ then, 
although total production may be increasing, per capita production and 
consumption will remain constant or decline. This underscores the 
importance combining policies to control the rate of population growth 
with policies to promote economic development. 
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